Public Lands Policy

Kayaking Barnum Pond, July 2011

Barnum Pond, right behind the Adirondack Vistors Intreprative Center, offers some great views, and can be accessed for free from NY 30, one mile north of VIC and one mile south of Mountain Pond Camping Area. Click on the map below, to display a full-size version, perfect for printing and slapping in a plastic bag, to strap on your kayak.

Here are some pictures I took while was paddling around this lake, proceeding from NY 30, along the Southern shore until I got to the Barnum Pond outlet, which you can continue on for about a mile until a beaver dam. You can portage around the beaver dam, if you choose, however a 1/2 mile below that is a series of man-made dams in Paul Smiths you must go around, to get down to Lower St Regis Lake.

Rainy Tuesday Morning

Edge of Barnum Pond

Adirondack VIC Observation Deck

Barnum Pond Outlet

 Treeline

Through the Marshlands of the VIC

Clouds Over Barnum Pond Outlet

Lighthouse Stairway Window

Splader Dack and Boreas Forest

Heading Back to Barnum Pond

Boreal Trees

Reflections

Southern Edge of Barnum Pond

Untitled

Spatterdock

South West on Barnum Pond

West Kill Valley

St Regis Mountain Across Barnum Pond

If you visit here, consider camping at Mountain Pond.

Why the Negative Sign?

Camping Prohibited

One question I have for the Department of Environmental Conservation, is why is almost all signs that they post phrased in the negative? Why emphasize what is prohibited, rather then what is allowed?

Couldn’t the DEC just have said:

HELP PRESERVE OUR FOREST!

Please camp more then 150 ft from trails, streams, roadways, except at designated locations. It’s the law!

That message is so much more friendly.

Federal Government vs State Government Signs.

And compare these two signs with the same message — one federal (Allegany National Forest) and one state (Black Dome Wilderness):

Foot Trail Only

Enough Snow to Ski

…Same message, only one is sounds nicer.

Association for the Protection of the Adirondacks v. Alexander MacDonald

As I could not find this court case online, despite being public domain, I obtained a copy from the Research Librarian at the Bethlehem Public Library. I am posting this case in it’s entirety, as it’s key to understanding the core holdings in the case, that must be upheld whenever a proposed use is undertaken in the forest preserve.

The Association for the Protection of the Adirondacks et al., Respondents, v.
Alexander MacDonald, Conservation Commissioner of the State of New York, et al., Appellants

[NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL]

Court of Appeals of New York

253 N.Y. 234; 170 N.E. 902; 1930 N.Y. LEXIS 820

February 11, 1930, Argued
March 18, 1930, Decided

PRIOR HISTORY.

[***1] Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, entered January 21, 1930, in favor of plaintiffs, upon the submission of a controversy under sections 546-548 of the Civil Practice Act.

Assn. for Protection of Adirondacks v. MacDonald, 228 App. Div. 73, affirmed.

DISPOSITION.

Judgment affirmed.

Cedar River Entrance Sign

OVERVIEW.

1929 N.Y. Laws ch. 417 was enacted to authorize the construction of a bobsleigh run in a forest preserve belonging to the state in order to provide facilities for the Olympic winter games. The officials planned to cut down 2,500 trees, and the association, a group that sought to protect state lands, objected, arguing that the state’s constitution prevented the cutting of the trees. The association obtained an injunction restraining the construction on the ground that the statute was void and unconstitutional, and the officials appealed. The court affirmed the decision, holding that ch. 417 was unconstitutional and that the timber on the lands in the forest preserve could not be cut and removed to construct a toboggan slide because N.Y. Const. art. VII, § 7 said that it could not be done. The court held that the constitution, like any other law, had to receive a reasonable interpretation, considering the purpose and the object in view, and the purpose of § 7 was that the forest preserve should be forever kept as wild forest lands and the timber could not be sold, removed, or destroyed.

Campsite North of Powley Place

SYLLABUS.

Chapter 417 of the Laws of 1929, authorizing the Conservation Commissioner to construct and maintain a bobsleigh run or slide on State lands in the Forest Preserve in the town of North Elba, necessitating the removal of a substantial number of trees from the land set aside therefor, is violative of section 7 of article 7 of the State Constitution, directing that timber in the Forest Preserve shall not be “sold, removed or destroyed,” and is, consequently, void.

COUNSEL: Hamilton Ward, Attorney-General (C. S. Ferris of counsel), for appellants. Section 7 of article 7 of the Constitution was not intended to prohibit the cutting of a relatively small number of trees, [***2] or even a single tree, when such cutting will in no wise impair the forest or subvert the purpose for which the Forest Preserve was acquired and is now being maintained. ( People ex rel. Manhattan Ry. Co. v. Barker, 152 N. Y. 433; People ex rel. Jackson v. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375; People v. Adirondack Ry. Co., 160 N. Y. 225; Einsfeld v. Murray, 149 N. Y. 367.)

Wallace T. Stock, Frederick T. Kelsey and John W. DeWitt for Public Park and Playgrounds District of the Town of North Elba, amicus curiae. The constitutional provision must be given a broad interpretation consistent with the purposes of government and with the ascertained intent of the framers thereof and of the people. ( People v. Tremaine, 252 N. Y. 27; Koster v. Coyne, 184 N. Y. 494; Matter of Burns, 155 N. Y. 23; Rochester v. Quintard, 136 N. Y. 221; People v. Petrea, 92 N. Y. 128; Matter of Gilbert El. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 361; Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 693; People v. Fancher, 50 N. Y. 288; People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50; People v. Lorillard, 135 N. Y. 285; [***3] Admiral Realty Co. v. City of N. Y., 206 N. Y. 110; Matter of Dowling, 219 N. Y. 44.) The intent of the People in adopting this provision of the Constitution was the preservation and use of the Forest Preserve as a great resort for the public for the purposes of health and recreation. (Black on Interpretation of Laws [2d ed.], pp. 20, 194; Wendell v. Lavin, 246 N. Y. 115; People v. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375; Sweet v. Syracuse, 129 N. Y. 316; Stradar v. Stern, 184 App. Div. 700; Waters v. Gerard, 189 N. Y. 302; People v. Mosher, 163 N. Y. 32; People v. Lyman, 157 N. Y. 368.) The proposed bobsled run is a proper and desirable use of the State’s forest lands, consistent with the Constitution. ( Matter of Watson, 226 N. Y. 384.)

Jacob Gould Schurman, Jr., George Welwood Murray, Samuel H. Ordway and Alanson W. Willcox for respondents. The history of section 7 of article 7 of the Constitution and the effect uniformly attributed to it, demonstrate the invalidity of chapter 417 of the Laws of 1929. ( People v. Adirondack R. Co., 160 N. Y. 225; Adirondack R. Co. v. Indian River Co., 27 App. Div. 326; [***4] People v. New York Central & H. R. R. R. Co., 161 App. Div. 322; 213 N. Y. 649; Newcombe v. Ostrander, 66 Misc. Rep. 103; 140 App. Div. 945.) The legislation in question cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police power or as a reasonable use of the Forest Preserve. ( Barrett v. State of New York, 220 N. Y. 423.)

JUDGES: Crane, J. Cardozo, Ch. J., Pound, Lehman, Kellogg, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ., concur.

OPINION BY: CRANE

Marshy Flow and Pillsbury Mountain

OPINION.

[*236] [**903] By chapter 417 of the Laws of 1929 the Conservation Commissioner is authorized to construct and maintain a bobsleigh run or slide on State lands in the Forest Preserve in the town of North Elba, Essex county, on the western slope of the Sentinel Range.

The act was passed for the purpose of providing facilities for the third Olympic winter games, which are to be held at or in the vicinity of Lake Placid, in the year 1932. The bobsleigh run will be approximately one and one-quarter miles in length and six and one-half feet wide, with a return route or go-back road. As additional land will have to be cleared on either side of the run, the width in actual use will be approximately sixteen feet, and twenty feet where the course curves. It is estimated that the [***5] construction will necessitate the removal of trees from about four and one-half acres of land, or a total number of trees, large and small, estimated at 2,500. The Forest Preserve within the Adirondacks consists of 1,941,403 acres. The taking of four acres out of this vast acreage for this international sports’ meet seems a very slight inroad upon the preserve for a matter of such public interest and benefit to the people of the State of New York and elsewhere. The Legislature, recognizing the benefits of an international gathering of this kind, has sought in the public interest, by the [*237] enactment of the above law, to provide appropriately and in the spirit of hospitality, the necessary equipment and facilities for these games, and contests, incident to winter sport, of which tobogganing is a large feature. Winter sports of course must be held in a place where there will be an assurance of sufficient continual cold weather for snow and ice, and the vicinity of Lake Placid gives this assurance. The western slope of the Sentinel range, chosen for the toboggan slide, is the nearest and most appropriate place for its construction in connection with the center of attractions.

[***6] Considering the distinction of having one of the beauty spots of New York State selected as appropriate for the International Olympic winter games and the advantages afforded by Lake Placid and its vicinity, together with the good will promoted in the recognition by the State, through its Legislature, of the event, what possible objection can there be to the above law permitting this toboggan slide to be constructed on State land? One objection, and one only — the Constitution of the State, which prevents the cutting of the trees. This objection has been raised by the Association for the Protection of the Adirondacks, which has sought and obtained an injunction restraining the Conservation Commission of this State and the Superintendent of Lands and Forests from constructing and maintaining the bobsleigh run on the ground that chapter 417 of the Laws of 1929 is unconstitutional and void.

The constitutional provision is HN1section 7 of article VII, reading: “The lands of the state, now owned or hereafter acquired, constituting the forest preserve as now fixed by law, shall be forever kept as wild forest lands. They shall not be leased, sold or exchanged, or be taken by any corporation, [***7] public or private, nor shall the timber thereon be sold, removed or destroyed.”

The lands and trees proposed to be taken for the toboggan slide are within the Forest Preserve and covered [*238] by this provision of the Constitution. Taking the words of section 7 in their ordinary meaning, we have the command that the timber, that is, the trees, shall not be sold, removed or destroyed. To cut down 2,500 trees for a toboggan slide, or perhaps for any other purpose, is prohibited. Some opinions, notably those of the Attorneys-General of the State, cited on the briefs and by the Appellate Division, have even gone so far as to state that a single tree, and even fallen timber and dead wood, cannot be removed; that to preserve the property as wild forest lands means to preserve it from the interference in any way by the hand of man.

HN2The words of the Constitution, like those of any other law, must receive a reasonable interpretation, considering the purpose [**904] and the object in view. ( State of Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379.) Words are but symbols indicating ideas and are subject to contraction and expansion to meet the idea sought to be expressed; [***8] they register frequently according to association, or like the thermometer, by the atmosphere surrounding them. The purpose of the constitutional provision, as indicated by the debates in the Convention of 1894, was to prevent the cutting or destruction of the timber or the sale thereof, as had theretofore been permitted by legislation, to the injury and ruin of the Forest Preserve. To accomplish the end in view, it was thought necessary to close all gaps and openings in the law, and to prohibit any cutting or any removal of the trees and timber to a substantial extent. The Adirondack Park was to be preserved, not destroyed. Therefore, all things necessary were permitted, such as measures to prevent forest fires, the repairs to roads and proper inspection, or the erection and maintenance of proper facilities for the use by the public which did not call for the removal of the timber to any material degree. The Forest Preserve is preserved for the public; its benefits are for the people of the State as a whole. Whatever the advantages may be of having wild forest lands [*239] preserved in their natural state, the advantages are for every one within the State and for the use [***9] of the people of the State. Unless prohibited by the constitutional provision, this use and preservation are subject to the reasonable regulations of the Legislature.

The laws developing the Forest Preserve and the Adirondack Park, up to the Constitution of 1894, are reviewed in the opinion of this court in People v. Adirondack Ry. Co. (160 N. Y. 225). By chapter 707 of the Laws of 1892 the State Park, known as the Adirondack Park, was created within certain of the Forest Preserve counties. Such park is to be “forever reserved, maintained and cared for as ground open for the free use of all the people for their health or pleasure, and as forest lands necessary to the preservation of the headwaters of the chief rivers of the State, and a future timber supply.”

Chapter 332 of the Laws of 1893, combining all previous acts, gave to the Forest Commissioners authority to sell certain timber on the Forest Preserve and also power to sell such of the lands as were not needed. They were also authorized to lease camp sites and lay out paths and roads in the park. Then came the Convention of 1894 with the debates indicating a change of policy regarding the sale and destruction of [***10] timber and the use of the lands. (Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894, vol. I, pp. 1100, 1148; vol. II, pp. 57, 1201; vol. IV, pp. 128, 137.)

At the time of the assembling of this Convention, the law of the State authorized the sale, lease, clearing and cultivation of lands in the Forest Preserve and the sale of standing or fallen timber thereon; also permitted the laying out of paths and roads through the property. (See chap. 283, Laws of 1885; chap. 475, Laws of 1887; chap. 707, Laws of 1892; chap. 332, Laws of 1893.)

With these laws before them and the statements in the debates revealing the depredations which had been made on the forest lands, and the necessity for restricting the [*240] appropriation of trees and timber, section 7 of article VII was adopted and became part of the Constitution January 1, 1895, where it has remained ever since.

No longer was the land or timber to be sold or even condemned for public purposes. ( People v. Adirondack Ry. Co., supra.) The forests were to be preserved as wild forest lands, and the trees were not to be sold or removed or destroyed. Whereas the Legislature had authorized the building of roads through [***11] these lands, this power was thereafter conferred not through legislation, but by constitutional amendments adopted in 1918 and 1927. The section with these amendments now reads: “Nothing contained in this section shall prevent the State from constructing a State highway from Saranac lake in Franklin county to Long lake in Hamilton county and thence to Old Forge in Herkimer county by way of Blue Mountain lake and Raquette lake, and nothing shall prevent the State from constructing a State highway in Essex county from Wilmington to the top of Whiteface mountain.” If it were deemed necessary to obtain a constitutional amendment for the construction of a State highway, the use to which the Forest Preserve might be put with legislative sanction was greatly limited. Trees could not be cut or the timber destroyed, even for the building of a road. This seems to be a fair conclusion to be drawn from the adoption of these constitutional amendments after the Constitution of 1894.

What may be done in these forest lands to preserve them or to open them up for the use of the public, or what reasonable cutting or removal of timber may be necessitated in order to properly preserve the State Park, [***12] we are not at this time called upon to determine. What regulations may reasonably be made by the Commission for the use of the park by campers and those who seek recreation and [**905] health in the quiet and solitude of the north woods is not before us in this case. The [*241] Forest Preserve and the Adirondack Park within it are for the reasonable use and benefit of the public, as heretofore stated. A very considerable use may be made by campers and others without in any way interfering with this purpose of preserving them as wild forest lands. (See “The Problem of the Wilderness” by Robert Marshall in “The Scientific Monthly,” Feb. 1930, p. 141.)

But the question still remains whether the construction of a toboggan slide, which requires the cutting of 2,500 trees, is such a reasonable use, or is forbidden by the Constitution.

Counsel for the appellants has very ably argued that as the underlying purpose of all these restrictions upon the State lands is to preserve them for the free use of all the people for their health and pleasure, the erection of a toboggan slide for sport is within this purpose. He has pressed upon our attention the fact that outdoor sports do [***13] much to maintain the health, the happiness and the welfare of the people of this State; and that if a branch of these outdoor sports is to a minor extent permitted within the public lands, the very purpose which the framers of the Constitution of 1894 had in mind will be accomplished; that it is the benefit to the people which this constitutional provision sought to preserve in the preservation of the forest. What can be more beneficial, asks counsel, than the establishment of forest sports, among which is classed this toboggan slide? We must admit much, if not all, that counsel has so eloquently pleaded in behalf of outdoor games. Perhaps much may be due to international sports, such as the Olympic games, lawn tennis, golf, even aviation, for creating good will among the nations, and a desire to establish those friendly relationships so vigorously claimed and earnestly sought for through treaties and world conferences. However tempting it may be to yield to the seductive influences of outdoor sports and international contests, we must not overlook the fact that [*242] constitutional provisions cannot always adjust themselves to the nice relationships of life. The framers [***14] of the Constitution, as before stated, intended to stop the willful destruction of trees upon the forest lands, and to preserve these in the wild state now existing; they adopted a measure forbidding the cutting down of these trees to any substantial extent for any purpose.

Tobogganing is not the only outdoor sport. Summer sports in the Adirondacks attract a larger number of people than the winter sports, simply for the reason, if no other, that the summer time still remains the vacation period for most of us. The same plea made for the toboggan slide in winter might be made for the golf course in summer, or for other sports requiring the use or the removal of timber. In other words, this plea in behalf of sport is a plea for an open door through which abuses as well as benefits may pass. The Constitution intends to take no more chances with abuses, and, therefore, says the door must be kept shut. The timber on the lands of the Adirondack Park in the Forest Preserve, or that on the western slope of the Sentinel range cannot be cut and removed to construct a toboggan slide simply and solely for the reason that section 7, article VII, of the Constitution says that it cannot be [***15] done. (emphasis added)

Consequently, chapter 417 of the Laws of 1929, permitting the erection of this bobsleigh slide and the destruction of the trees is unconstitutional, and the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

What are Alienations and Non-Alienations of Parkland?

As all park land (including local parks, county parks, state forests and forest preserve) in NY State belong to all of the people, it is important that they remain in the hands of the people, for all to use and enjoy for all times. Only under specific circumstances can government take park land away from the people, and when they do, they must always replace it with some of comparable or greater value.

Today’s fodder is an excerpt from the Alienation Handbook put out by Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation.

Hikers Enjoy the Purty Lake

The following have been determined by the courts to be alienations:

  • The conveyance, sale, or lease of municipal parkland or recreational facilities to another entity, such as an adjoining property owner, a developer, or a school district, which results in the facility no longer being used for public park and recreation purposes.
  • The lease of municipal park or recreational facilities even though the resource may continue to be used for public park and recreational purposes.
  • The use of parkland by a municipality for a non-park purpose, such as for a water filtration facility, a landfill, a museum, senior housing, temporary parking of police or municipal vehicles, or street construction.
  • Restricting to local residents the use of recreational facilities that had previously been open to all persons.
  • Failure to keep a public park or recreational facility equally open to the public. A public park or recreational facility must be open to the public on an equitable basis. Where availability of public facilities is limited, such as with ball fields or marina berths, the use of facilities should be determined by some method which gives everyone the same opportunity for access, such as assignment on a “first-come, first-served” basis, or by using a lottery system.

North East

These are considered to be non-alienations:

  • The construction and subsequent issuance of a revocable license for the operation of a park facility such as a cafe, snack bar, parking, or for a boat rental service which serves park patrons in connection with their use of the park.
  • A revocable permit for the use of park facilities for a special program or function, such as an arts and crafts fair, or a permit of greater duration for the temporary use of park facilities which are not otherwise being used by the public. The permit should contain a provision that it may be revoked at-will by the municipality. A temporary use should not be allowed to lapse into a permanent one.
  • The operation of a public park or recreational facility by a private concern. A public park and recreational facility need not be operated by a public entity, but may be a facility operated by a private, profit-making concern on behalf of a municipality under a lease or license agreement. To remain a public facility, the agreement must serve a public purpose, and must not result in exclusively private use. Also, the use must be one that is compatible and appropriate for the park or recreational area in question.
  • Charging ìuse fees, as long as they are reasonable and non-discriminatory. Where use fees are charged, whether by a public or private operator, they should not be in excess of those charged for comparable facilities in the area. A municipality may charge persons who are not residents of the community higher fees than it charges to residents, but case law suggests that non-resident fees should not substantially exceed the comparable fees assessed to residents.

Section 212 of the State Highway Law

Section 212 of Highway Law.

S 212. Changing location of highways over certain lands owned and occupied by the state. 1. If a highway passes over or through lands wholly owned and occupied by the state, the location of such portion of such highway as passes through such lands may be altered and changed, or the same may be abandoned or the use thereof as a highway discontinued with the consent and approval of the state authority having jurisdiction or control over such lands by an order directing such change in location, abandonment or discontinuance. Such order shall contain a description of that portion of the highway the location of which has been changed, abandoned or discontinued, and a description of the new location thereof, if any, and shall be filed in the office of the state authority having control of such lands.

 Relatively Smooth Section of Crane Pond Road

John J. Kelly v. DEC Commissioner Jorling (1990).

You can read the court case online.

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT

November 21, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF JOHN J. KELLY, APPELLANT,
v.
THOMAS C. JORLING, AS COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, RESPONDENT

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Dominick J. Viscardi, J.), entered March 29, 1990 in Essex County in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, which dismissed a petition to prohibit respondent from directing closure of a portion of a road traversing State-owned land in Essex County.

Roemer & Featherstonhaugh (E. Guy Roemer of counsel), for appellant.

Robert Abrams, Attorney-General (Lawrence A. Rappoport of counsel), for respondent.

Kane, J. P. Casey, Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., and Mercure, JJ., concur.

Author: Kane

OPINION OF THE COURT

Crane Pond Road is a gravel and dirt roadway located in the Town of Schroon, Essex County, of which the last 2 1/2 miles (hereinafter referred to as the road) lead through State-owned lands to the edge of Crane Pond. That part of the Adirondack Forest Preserve surrounding the road was reclassified “wilderness” in 1979 and, in 1987, the road itself was reclassified wilderness. In December 1989, respondent issued an order, pursuant to Highway Law ? 212, closing the road in accordance with the Adirondack State Land Master Plan. Guidelines within that plan called for the closing of roads which impermissibly allowed for the prohibited use by the public of motorized vehicles and equipment in wilderness areas. Petitioner, the Town Supervisor, subsequently commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge respondent’s authority to close the road pursuant to Highway Law ? 212. Supreme Court found that respondent possessed such authority and dismissed the petition. This appeal followed.

We affirm. Petitioner apparently does not question respondent’s jurisdiction over the lands at issue or the State’s power to close the road, but instead challenges the specific statutory authority pursuant to which respondent ordered said closing. Highway Law Sec 212 was amended in 1988 to read as follows: “If a highway passes over or through lands wholly owned and occupied by the state, the location of such portion of such highway as passes through such lands may be altered and changed, or the same may be abandoned or the use thereof as a highway discontinued with the consent and approval of the state authority having jurisdiction or control over such lands by an order directing such change in location, abandonment or discontinuance. Such order shall contain a description of that portion of the highway the location of which has been changed, abandoned or discontinued, and a description of the new location thereof, if any, and shall be filed in the office of the state authority having control of such lands.” The 1988 amendment eliminated the need for the Commissioner of Transportation to issue the order of closure (see, L 1988, ch 161, ? 2), essentially leaving that decision to the State agency having appropriate jurisdiction (see, mem of State Dept of Transp, 1988 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 1980-1981). Petitioner argues that the express language of the statute does not specifically authorize respondent to issue an order of closure and that no such power may properly be inferred therefrom. We disagree.

The primary consideration of statutory construction is legislative intent (see, Matter of Long v Adirondack Park Agency, 76 N.Y.2d 416, 422; Hudson City Savs. Inst. v Drazen, 153 A.D.2d 91, 93; see also, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes ? 92), and courts are to avoid a literal construction when it leads to either a frustration of the over-all design of the Legislature (see, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes ? 111) or an ineffectually absurd result (see, Matter of Long v Adirondack Park Agency, supra, at 421; see also, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes ?? 144, 145). The legislative intent behind Highway Law ? 212 was to permit the State to close roads on State lands that endangered a State purpose (see, Matter of Altona Citizens Comm. v Hennessy, 77 A.D.2d 956, 957, lv denied 52 N.Y.2d 705). Adopting petitioner’s view, that respondent has the power to consent to and approve the closing of a roadway but does not possess the authority to order its closure, would eviscerate the statute and render it meaningless. In our view, the statute’s expressed intent provides an ample basis and rationale to conclude that “the state authority having jurisdiction or control over [state] lands” (Highway Law ? 212) is empowered to issue orders effectuating that authority. Accordingly, respondent’s order was a valid exercise of the statutory power given to the appropriate State agency pursuant to Highway Law ? 212.

Disposition

Judgment affirmed, without costs.

North Up to Piseco-Powley

In the Matter of the Alleged Violations by JAMES W. McCULLEY, Respondent. (2009)

This is an excerpt of relvant portions of this adminstrative law decision.

2. Department’s Jurisdiction To Regulate Motor Vehicle Traffic Over Old Mountain Road

Department staff contends that the portion of Lot 146 owned by the State is part of the forest preserve. Accordingly, staff asserts jurisdiction to regulate motor vehicle traffic over that portion of Old Mountain Road that crosses State-owned land.

Department staff has established that the State-owned portion of Lot 146 is part of the forest preserve. It is undisputed that the State acquired the northern half and southeastern quarter of Lot 146 in 1875 (see Deed, Department Exh 48, at 556). The forest preserve was subsequently created by chapter 283 of the Laws of 1885, which provided in relevant part:

“All lands now owned or which may hereinafter be acquired by the state of New York within the counties of . . . Essex . . . shall constitute and be known as the forest preserve.”

(L 1885, ch 283, § 7). Chapter 283 is now codified at ECL 9- 0101(6). Thus, the State-owned portion of Lot 146 was and remains part of the forest preserve.

The existence of Old Mountain Road as a public right of way, however, pre-dates the State’s ownership of Lot 146. In the 1810 legislation appropriating money for the repair of Old Mountain Road, the State Legislature declared the road to be a “public highway” (L 1810, ch CLXXVII, § I). Because the Legislature did not provide for acquisition of the fees underlying the public highway, the public acquired merely an easement of passage, the fee title remaining in the landowners (see Bashaw v Clark, 267 AD2d 681, 684-685 [1999]). Thus, when the State acquired its portion of Lot 146 from the prior landowner, it did so subject to a public highway in the nature of an easement (see id.; see also Matter of Moncure v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 218 AD2d 262, 267 [1996] [when the Department acquires forest preserve lands burdened by a leasehold, the Department takes such property subject to that leasehold]).

Department staff asserts that subsequent statutory law vests the Department with jurisdiction over public rights of way crossing forest preserve land. Accordingly, citing the Vehicle and Traffic Law, Department staff asserts that it has the power to “prohibit, restrict or regulate” motor vehicle traffic on any highway under its jurisdiction, including Old Mountain Road (see Vehicle and Traffic Law [“VTL”] § 1630). Pursuant to section 1630, Department staff claims it has the authority to close Old Mountain Road to motor vehicle traffic while allowing pedestrian and other forms of non-motorized traffic (see Adirondack Park State Land Master Plan [updated June 2001], DEC Exh 17, at 66 [indicated that Old Military Road has been closed]).

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that Old Mountain Road was and remains under the jurisdiction of the Towns of North Elba and Keene. 3 Thus, respondent contends that the exception under 6 NYCRR 196.1(b) for roads under the jurisdiction of a town highway department applies in this case (see 6 NYCRR 196.1[b][1]). Respondent contends that the exception for public rights of way over State land also applies (see 6 NYCRR 196.1[b][5]).4

VTL § 1630 does not itself vest in the Department jurisdiction over any particular highway. Whether a State agency has jurisdiction to regulate motor vehicle traffic pursuant to section 1630 depends upon whether that agency is otherwise authorized by law to regulate the use and management of the public highway at issue (see People v Noto, 92 Misc 2d 611, 612- 613 [1977]; see also Highway Law § 3)

On this motion, it cannot be determined, as a matter of law, which entity has jurisdiction to regulate the use and management of Old Mountain Road. When the New York State Legislature declared Old Mountain Road to be a public highway in 1810, it provided that after an initial four-year period of repair and improvement by a commissioner specially appointed for that purpose, the maintenance of the road would be assumed by the several towns through which it passed (see L 1810, ch CLXXVII, § III). Thus, at the time the State acquired Lot 146, subject to the public right of way, that right of way was apparently a town road under the jurisdiction of the Town of Keene and later the Town of North Elba (see Highway Law § 3[5]).5

Nothing in the submissions on this motion allow me to conclude, as a matter of law, that jurisdiction to regulate the use and management of Old Mountain Road has transferred from the Towns of North Elba and Keene to the Department. To the contrary, conflicting statutory provisions and circumstantial evidence require further legal argument and evidentiary proof before such a determination can be made.

For example, in support of Departmental jurisdiction to regulate traffic, Department staff notes that when the powers of the Conservation Department were revised in 1916, the “free use of roads” provision from the 1885 law limiting the forest commission’s power to prescribe rules and regulations for the forest preserve, was eliminated (see L 1916, ch 451). Staff further notes that the current ECL and Executive Law provisions authorizing the Department to make necessary rules and regulations for the protection of the forest preserve generally, and the Adirondack Park specifically, contain no limitation on regulating the free use of roads (see ECL 9-0105[3]; Executive Law § 816). However, although the Department has the power to regulate uses of the forest preserve generally, and the Adirondack Park specifically, it does not necessarily follow that such power includes the authority to regulate public rights of way under the jurisdiction of other State entities or municipalities.

In contrast, legislation adopted subsequent to 1916 suggests that the Department was not vested with the power to regulate use and maintenance of highways in the forest preserve. In 1924, the former State Commission of Highways was granted the power to maintain existing State and county highways in the forest preserve (see L 1924, ch 275). In 1937, town superintendents were expressly granted the right to occupy a right of way over State lands as may be required in the maintenance or reconstruction of town highways that cross those lands, subject to the approval of the Superintendent of Public Works and the Conservation Commissioner (see L 1937, ch 488). The grant of a right of way over State land to maintain and repair town highways strongly implies that towns retained jurisdiction over town highways in the forest preserve, notwithstanding the Department’s grant of authority to regulate the forest preserve generally (see Flacke v Town of Fine, 113 Misc 2d 56 [1982]).

Department staff also points out that Old Mountain Road has not appeared on either the Town of North Elba or the Town of Keene inventory of town highways. The evidence on this is equivocal, however. Old Mountain Road has not appeared on any inventory of State or county highways either (see L 1921, ch 18 [designating system of State and county highways]). On the other hand, Old Mountain Road did appear on a 1935 Highway Survey Commission map, although its status as a State, county or town highway is not indicated (see Department Exhs 51-53).

Respondent provides some circumstantial evidence suggesting that the Towns of North Elba and Keene retain the jurisdiction to regulate traffic on Old Mountain Road. For example, in 1971, the Town of North Elba adopted a resolution, which is still in effect, regulating the use of snowmobiles on Old Mountain Road (see N. Elba Ordinance [2-12-71], Affidavit of Norman Harlow, Highway Superintendent, Town of North Elba, Exh B). Respondent also provides letters dated June 7 and November 13, 1996, respectively, from Mr. Tom Wahl, former Department Regional Forester, expressing the opinion that Old Mountain Road remains a town highway (see Respondent Exhs 16 and 17).

Finally, research reveals some authority suggesting that Old Mountain Road is under the jurisdiction of predecessors to the Department of Transportation (see People v Paul Smith’s Elec. Light and Power and R.R. Co., Sup Ct, Essex County, July 29, 1953, Imrie, J., Decision, at 3-4, 6; 1950 Opn of the Atty Gen 153-154). Whether the portions of Old Mountain Road at issue here are subject to the above authorities, however, is unclear at this time.

In sum, legal and factual issues exist concerning whether the Department has jurisdiction under VTL § 1630 to regulate motor vehicle traffic on Old Mountain Road that require further hearings and legal argument.

3. Request for Relief Pursuant to Highway Law § 212

In its motion for order without hearing, Department staff requests an order of the Commissioner declaring Old Mountain Road between the eastern and western boundaries of the Sentinel Range Wilderness Area closed to all motorized vehicles and motorized equipment. Among the statutory authorities staff relies upon for this request is Highway Law § 212.

Highway Law § 212 provides:

“If a highway passes over or through lands wholly owned and occupied by the state, the location of such portion of such highway as passes through such lands may be altered and changed, or the same may be abandoned or the use thereof as a highway discontinued with the consent and approval of the state authority having jurisdiction or control over such lands by an order directing such change in location, abandonment or discontinuance”

The Department is the State authority with jurisdiction to order abandonment or discontinuance of roads over forest preserve lands in order to protect a relevant State interest (see Matter of Kelly v Jorling, 164 AD2d 181 [1990], lv denied 77 NY2d 807 [1991]; see also Matter of Altona Citizens Comm., Inc. v Hennessy, 77 AD2d 956, lv denied 52 NY2d 705). Such authority includes the power to order the discontinuance or abandonment of town highways (see id.).

Department staff does not address this request for relief in its brief in support of its motion. Nevertheless, to the extent Department staff contends that the Department has already closed Old Mountain Road pursuant to Highway Law § 212, I conclude that triable issues exist before the requested relief may be granted. Staff supplies no evidence that a Departmental order pursuant to Highway Law § 212 has been filed with respect to that portion of Old Mountain Road that is at issue in this case. Accordingly, to the extent Department staff relies upon such a closure order in support of the violation alleged against respondent, staff has not established a prima facie case.

With respect to abandonment, an order of closure is not required to deem a public right of way extinguished by operation of law if the highway has in fact been abandoned by the public for six years or more (see Matter of Wills v Town of Orleans, 236 AD2d 889, 890 [1997]). However, the record reveals triable issues of fact concerning abandonment (see Matter of Smigel v Town of Rensselaerville, 283 AD2d 863, 864 [2001] [a determination of abandonment is a factual determination]).

Pedestrian use and even recreational use may support a finding of non-abandonment, even if a highway has not been subject to motor vehicle traffic, as staff alleges in this case (see Town of Leray v New York Cent. R. Co., 226 NY 109 [1919] [pedestrian use may preserve highway though vehicles are barred]; Matter of Smigel, 283 AD2d at 865 [recreational use may preclude finding of abandonment]). The record contains conflicting evidence concerning the degree to which the public has continued to use the road, thereby necessitating a hearing on abandonment.

With respect to discontinuance, assuming Department staff is seeking a prospective order from the Commissioner, such a prospective order would not support the violation alleged here. Moreover, it is not clear what findings, if any, the Commissioner must make and whether such an order can be issued on the present record. Again, Department staff does not address this item of relief in its brief. Accordingly, the request for a prospective order of closure pursuant to Highway Law § 212 is denied, without prejudice.

 Purple Flowers Along Otter Brook Road

Adirondack Council Press Release (2009).

You can read it here.

ADIRONDACK COUNCIL CALLS ON ENCON COMMISSIONER GRANNIS TO CLOSE FOREST PRESERVE ROADS IN WAKE OF JUDGE’S DECISION

Administrative Judge Declares Former Town Road in State Wilderness Area to be Open for Motorized Use; Grannis Should Re-Close it and Any Others Affected

For more information:
John F. Sheehan
518-432-1770 (ofc)
518-441-1340 (cell)

Released: Thursday, May 21, 2009

LAKE PLACID, N.Y. – The Adirondack Council today called on NYS Department of Environmental Conservation Commissioner Peter Grannis to use his administrative authority to re-close a former road in an Adirondack Wilderness Area that was opened to motorized traffic today by a state administrative law judge.

“It appears from the judge’s decision that the state didn’t properly close this road when it assumed ownership of it and converted it to a hiking, ski and horse trail,” said Adirondack Council Executive Director Brian L. Houseal. “But today’s decision doesn’t have to be the final word on the matter.

“Commissioner Grannis has the authority to use the NYS Vehicle and Traffic Law to prohibit the use of motorized vehicles on this and other roads that are affected by this decision,” Houseal explained. “We urge Commissioner Grannis to begin that process right away. He should have done so today, as this decision was announced, to avoid the chance that someone is already out there riding a jeep or an all-terrain vehicle on this road.

“It is also imperative that the DEC issue its ATV Policy for state lands, which was first announced by Commissioner Erin Crotty during the Pataki Administration,” Houseal said. “DEC cannot allow fragile wildlife habitat and water quality to suffer in New York’s premiere Wilderness Park due to DEC’s inability to complete its work in a timely way.”

Commissioner Grannis can act right now to stop motorized traffic in off-limits locations in the Adirondack Park by exercising NYS Highway Law Section 212, Houseal said,

NYS Highway Law Section 212:

§ 212. Changing location of highways over certain lands owned and occupied by the state. If a highway passes over or through lands wholly owned and occupied by the state, the location of such portion of such highway as passes through such lands may be altered and changed, or the same may be abandoned or the use thereof as a highway discontinued with the consent and approval of the state authority having jurisdiction or control over such lands by an order directing such change in location, abandonment or discontinuance. Such order shall contain a description of that portion of the highway the location of which has been changed, abandoned or discontinued, and a description of the new location thereof, if any, and shall be filed in the office of the state authority having control of such lands.

“If Commissioner Grannis doesn’t make use of Section 212, today’s decision could turn into a disaster for the natural character of the Adirondack Park,” Houseal explained. “There are more than one million acres of protected, roadless Wilderness in the Adirondack Park. It represents nearly 85 percent of all roadless, wilderness forest lands in the eastern United States. Yet, it is only 1/30th of New York State’s total land area – very rare.

“Opening these roads to motorized traffic will harm wildlife, water quality and the peaceful nature of the last big place left in the Northeast where you can escape the noise and pollution of motorized traffic,” he said.

Under the Adirondack Park State Land Master Plan, approved by the Legislature in 1972, all motorized or mechanized travel is banned by state law in Adirondack Wilderness Areas, including mountain bikes.

Another 1.5 million acres of the public Adirondack Forest Preserve is classified as Wild Forest, where motorized traffic is allowed on some designated highways, but not in sensitive areas. Today’s ruling could be interpreted to mean that any road that was never lawfully abandoned to motorized traffic is now open, regardless of its classification as Wilderness or Wild Forest.

The Adirondack Council is a privately funded not-for-profit organization dedicated to ensuring the ecological integrity and wild character of New York’s 9,300-square-mile Adirondack Park. The Council carries out its mission through research, education, advocacy and legal action. The Council has members in all 50 United States and on four continents.

Tiny Roadside Campsite

Resolution from Adirondack Assocation of Towns (2010).

From their 2010 Adirondack Towns Association Resolution Book.

RESOLUTION REQUESTING AMENDMENT OF HIGHWAY LAW SECTION 212 BACKGROUND OF RESOLUTION

The State of New York has closed Town roads in the Adirondacks without the consent and against the wishes of the involved Towns. Highway Law Section 212 which has been interpreted by the courts to authorize the Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Conservation to close roads by Commissioner’s order should be repealed or amended to remove that authority, because it does not provide due process to residents and the involved Towns. The remaining provisions of the Highway Law provide a procedure for towns to close abandoned town roads and to discontinue maintenance on roads which do not provide access to structures by declaring them to be “Qualified Abandoned”.

Whereas, Highway Law Section 212 entitled “Changing location of highways over certain lands owned and occupied by the state” provides as follows:

“If a highway passes over or through lands wholly owned and occupied by the state, the location of such portion of such highway as passes through such lands may be altered and19 changed, or the same may be abandoned or the use thereof as a highway discontinued with the consent and approval of the state authority having jurisdiction or control over such lands by an order directing such change in location, abandonment or discontinuance. Such order shall contain a description of that portion of the highway the location of which has been changed, abandoned or discontinued, and a description of the new location thereof, if any, and shall be filed in the office of the state authority having control of such lands.”

Whereas, the Appellate Division held in Altona Citizens Committee, Incorporated v. Hennessy, 77 AD2d 956 (3rd Dept., 1980) that “Section 212 as originally adopted, related to closing or changing the location of highways passing over lands wholly owned and occupied by the State for farm or prison purposes (L. 1920, ch. 558, s 1). In 1924, the statute was amended to permit the application of the statute to State lands without regard to their use (L. 1924, ch. 141). The removal of the restriction that only prison or farm lands were covered by the statute indicates a legislative intention that closure be permitted whenever a State purpose is endangered by a roadway on State land. To effectuate this intention of the Legislature the occupancy requirement of section 212 of the Highway Law should be given a liberal construction.”

Whereas, the State used Section 212 to close a road in the Town of Altona in the 1970s despite the fact that the State did not occupy the land and despite the fact that the land was occupied by the Ganienkeh group of Indians; and Whereas, the State used Section 212 to close a road in the Town of Wells in the 1970s (see Town of Wells v. New York State Department of Transportation, 90 Misc2d 535 [Sup. Ct. Hamilton County, 1977]); and

Where as, in December 1989 the Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Conservation ordered the closure of a well traveled town road (Crane Pond Road) in the Town of Schroon pursuant to Section 212, without the approval and despite the opposition of the duly elected officials of the Town of Schroon, (see Kelly v. Jorling, 164 AD2d 181 [3rd Dept., 1990]); and

Whereas, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation proposes in the Silver Lake Unit Management Plan recently approved by the Adirondack Park Agency to “work with the Town of Wells”: to close the West River Road in the Town of Wells; and

Whereas, the Town Board of the Town of Wells is adamantly opposed to the closure of West River Road and wishes to continue to maintain it and to keep it open to the traveling public as it has been open for many decades; and

Whereas, Highway Law Section 212 as it currently exists; and as it has been interpreted, is a threat to the authority of the duly elected officials of the Town of Wells and their ability to maintain their transportation system; and20

Whereas, Section 212 also constitutes a threat to every town and village in the Adirondacks which has a town and village road passing through state lands,

NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby RESOLVED that the Adirondack Association of Towns and Villages hereby requests that a bill be introduced in the New York State Legislature to amend Section 212 to make it clear that Section 212 may not be used by the State to close town and village roads in the Adirondacks, except where the lands are occupied and used by the State for prison or farm purposes as Section 212 provided when originally enacted.

CURRENT STATUS: DEC Commissioner Grannis dismissed an enforcement proceeding in Essex County against an individual driving on a road that the DEC had said was Forest Preserve on the ground that it had not been demonstrated that the road was an abandoned road or that the road was not a legal right-ofway for public use. The decision of Commissioner Grannis supports the town’s position that the DEC does not have the authority to close town roads that the town has continually maintained and does not wish to abandon.

Milepost 6 on Plains Road

Assemblywomen Sayward’s Bill Limiting Section 212 to Areas Outside of Adirondack Park (2011).

                STATE OF NEW YORK
        ________________________________________________________________________
 
            S. 343                                                    A. 149
 
                               2011-2012 Regular Sessions
 
                SENATE - ASSEMBLY
 
                                       (Prefiled)
 
                                     January 5, 2011
                                       ___________
 
        IN  SENATE — Introduced by Sen. LITTLE — read twice and ordered print-
          ed, and when printed to be committed to the Committee  on  Transporta-
          tion
 
        IN  ASSEMBLY — Introduced by M. of A. SAYWARD — read once and referred
          to the Committee on Transportation
 
        AN ACT to amend the highway law, in relation to changing the location of
          highways over certain lands owned and occupied by  the  state  in  the
          Adirondack park
 
          The  People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assem-
        bly, do enact as follows:
 
     1    Section 1. Section 212 of the highway law, as amended by  chapter  161
     2  of the laws of 1988, is amended to read as follows:
     3    §  212.  Changing  location  of  highways over certain lands owned and
     4  occupied by the state. 1. If a highway  passes  over  or  through  lands
     5  wholly  owned and occupied by the state, the location of such portion of
     6  such highway as passes through such lands may be altered and changed, or
     7  the same may be abandoned or the use thereof as a  highway  discontinued
     8  with the consent and approval of the state authority having jurisdiction
     9  or  control  over  such  lands  by  an  order  directing  such change in
    10  location, abandonment or discontinuance.  Such  order  shall  contain  a
    11  description  of  that  portion  of the highway the location of which has
    12  been changed, abandoned or discontinued, and a description  of  the  new
    13  location  thereof, if any, and shall be filed in the office of the state
    14  authority having control of such lands.
    15    2. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any highway with-
    16  in the Adirondack park, as defined in subdivision one of section  9-0101
    17  of the environmental conservation law.
    18    § 2. This act shall take effect immediately.
 
         EXPLANATION--Matter in italics (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
                              [ ] is old law to be omitted.
                                                                   LBD01285-01-1

Intensive Use Confusion Over Moose River Plains

Recently, the Adirondack Park Agency adopted several changes to Moose River Plains Wild Forest in the master map of the Adirondack Park. One of the biggest changes was to convert an area around Moose River Plains Road and Red River Road into an “Intensive Use Area” known as the “Moose River Plains Camping Area” (MRPCA), to allow campsites to remain that are within 1/4 mile of each other, which otherwise would violate the Adirondack Park Land State Master Plan (APLSMP) for Wild Forest.

The change is pretty slight, described as in Moose River Plains Intensive Use Area Plan (PDF):

“The proposed MRPCA will look very similar to the existing roadside uses in the MRPWF. The sole purpose for proposing the creation of the MRPCA is to allow roadside camping in higher density than can be allowed under wild forest guidelines. Although the APSLMP will recognize this newly created intensive use area as a campground by definition, the overall management goals include protecting the wild character of both the MRPCA and the MRPWF. The Department intends to manage this area in a manner that is much more reflective of wild forest guidelines, with the exception of the camp site separation distance guideline. The management responsibilities for the MRPCA will remain with the Division of Lands and Forests and will be regulated under those parts of NYCRR 6 Part 190 that are applicable to the adjoining wild forest lands. Due to the close relationship between the MRPWF and the MRPCA any future revisions to either UMP will require an assessment of potential impacts on both units and possibly a revision to both UMPs.”

“Unlike other intensive use area campgrounds in the Park, amenities such as bath houses, playgrounds, and paved drives are not ever going to be considered for the MRPCA. What is envisioned for the MRPCA is up to 150 roadside campsites along approximately 20 miles of roads through the MRPWF. These sites will have fire rings,pit privies and picnic tables as their only amenities. Some of these sites are relatively close to the road, while others are several hundred feet back and are accessed by short driveways. A majority of these sites will be comprised of existing sites, some fairly well separated from other sites and some clustered in small groups. This provides for a variety of camping opportunities depending on what users are seeking. Existing sites that are very close to the road may be relocated to a location that provides better screening or may be converted to parking areas with a walk‐in site located a short distance from the parking area. Any newly constructed sites will be located in a manner to provide vegetative screening between the site and the road.”

The confusing part of this comes into the fact these lands will be considered “Intensive Use”, which is essentially a symonym for “DEC Campground” in APLSMP. While few people read APLSMP, many people buy maps and go onto websites to figure out where they are going to camp.

 Cascade Falls

Map makers, especially those not from the Adirondacks will likely fail to distinguish between the Moose River Plains Camping Area, and a more developed campground like that of DEC Campground Limekiln Lake, DEC Campground Eight Lake, or DEC Campground Indian Lake. Indeed, this what concerns the DEC in the MRPCA plan:

“Although use levels within the current MRPWF have been fairly stable for the past several years, the creation of a new area, even if only by name, may initially result in an increase in camping use of the area.”

“The creation of the MRPCA will create some challenges in educating the public as to what to expect within the area. As the area will not charge fees, nor will reservations be taken, users will be arriving at the area without the benefit of knowing what site they may be camping at. Users will need to drive through the area and locate a site that is suitable for their needs. In the unlikely case that no sites are available, users will need to be educated as to what alternatives exist in the general area. Providing information at the two entrance points, Cedar RiverFlow and Limekiln Lake, will be an important part of informing users of the type of opportunity available in the MRPCA. It will also provide an opportunity to provide information on alternative locations should the MRPCA not meet their expectations. Additional information will be made available on the Department’s website and inthe revised unit brochure for the MRPWF.”

If these changes make it to the DEC website it would be helpful…

Yet, we know the DEC often does not put important information on it’s website, and indeed it seems likely the Division of Operations which operates the Limekiln, Eight Lake, and Indian Lake Campgrounds would fight to avoid including a “free” camping area that could directly compete with their $25 a night sites, that offer only minimally nicer ammenities such as centralized trash dumpsters, flush toilets, and showers. Moose River Plains, if promoted by Division of Lands and Forest could canabalize the business of these other campsites.

Site 57 in the Plains

People will be in for a surpise if they come up here, looking for an established campground. Roadside campsites are spread out over 20 miles, people are often 30 miles from the nearest gas station. The roads are rough, they can be challenging in places to travel with a car. Without regular patrols and surrounded by vast Wild Forest and Wilderness on four sides, the possibility of people getting lost grows. Already, people get lost up here, but with additional promotion through the name change — and the attraction to those unfamiliar with the Adirondack tradition of roadside camping, it’s only asking for trouble.

Thunderstorm Coming to the Plains

The changes to the Moose River Wild Forest may be needed to keep the majority of the camping sites open and compatible with the APSLMP, but it seems as though converting Moose River Plains Road to Intensive Use, and indicating it on maps as such, only will lead to more confusion.

Only 31 Miles to Indian Lake

The state should instead admend the Adirondack Park Master Plan:

  1. Make existing “road-side” legacy campsites less then 1/4 mile separation legal.
  2. Require only new campsites that are developed to have the 1/4 mile separation.

Think Locally, Act Locally

In 1970, Earth Day activists talked about Thinking Globally, But Acting Locally. Their argument was that what one community does, effects other communities. Yet, it’s too difficult to affect international communities, so it’s best to focus locally. Yet, today we see the problem with thinking too globally and ignoring local concerns.

Thunderstorm Coming to the Plains

On this Earth Day I would suggest a different approach to environmental problems: rather then thinking globally and acting locally, we should instead think locally and act locally. Despite all the hype about global commerce, and advances in transportation, we spend most of our lives locally in places that should matter.

Geese in Chenango River

Local places are any places where we reside, work, or otherwise spend time in. Too often local places do not get the attention they deserve. There is such a national and international focus on issues, and our nearby surroundings get ignored at the cost of bigger issues. This Earth Day we should pay more attention to our communities, to their needs, and their future.

Too often all the action and concern is over big issues. There will certainly be a lot cry and concern about Climate Change and fossil fuels this year. That’s a big issue. But what about our own communities? Is their a need to demand better transit options, better parks, and more businesses nearby? Especially with rising gas prices, we should be concerned more about our community’s well being, as it’s getting more and more expensive to get away.

Lower Blue Ridge

We do not need any more cookie cutter communities or standardized designs that reflect global trends. We need to think more locally, more about building communities that suit local needs, not theoretical national or international trends. It’s time we moved away from a one size fits all, and work to develop communities that serve local needs efficiently and desirably.