I guess technically the snow the steam plant produces is usually black in color, but it’s still kind of that unusual April snow, though it’s not sticking to the pavement in Delmar, and supposed to warm up but get very windy by afternoon.
Perfect weather for riding my bike to work, 🚲 actually the snow stopped a few minutes ago, though I’ll probably get somewhat wet riding in. Better make sure I have those other set of socks 🧦 in my office desk when I get to Assembly’s World Data Headquarters. A very unhappy looking Mourning Dove 🕊️ is peering in my window (what a pervert!), looking down on the rather white grass from the dusting of wet snow we got a few minutes ago. Honestly, I just don’t want to have to deal with the CDTA App now that my Navigator card 💳 is expired. Or the protestors at the Capitol. Wind is expected to be roaring by afternoon. 🌬️ If it’s too bad I can catch a bus home, but it’s usually not too bad in the hollow riding back.
Yesterday was a Monday and I was surprisingly tired 😫 all day at work, but I kept pushing on. Only one more majority district to update. 📂 The two supervisors were out, so I was managing everything besides my other normal responsibilities as director. I was asleep last night I don’t know around 7:30 PM as it was cold, 🛏️ and I was tired. Stopped at Hannaford on my bike ride home, got milk, and two impulse purchases – edmame and spinach. I do like edmame, I was told you’re not supposed to eat the shells, but I do as I like to maximize the fiber in my diet. But I also eat the skins on potatoes 🥔 and sometimes bananas 🍌. It helps move the crap through your pooper, 💩 and fills your stomach without a lot of calories. The world is built on manure. Stanton’s got their tanks of cow shit 🐮 rolling down past my parents house, as they prepare the fields for spring. I remember walking home, 🚶 ducking off the road and plugging my noise as they came rolling down the road, spewing diesel smoke and flakes of cow poop off tanker trucks.
It will be interesting to see how much gas prices go up today, ⛽ with the Trumpster threatening to blow up the bridges and power plants in Iran 🇮🇷 as part of his war criming scheme, that nobody seems to understand outside of the President’s form of public masterbastion. I guess it feels good and is groovy. I was too busy holding the multiple hats 🎩 at work yesterday to research and build truck caps, I think I will most likely go with an ARE Cap assuming that Ruth’s thinks I can take delivery before July. Kind of a bad time of year to get one built, as I’m sure it’s their busy time, but I couldn’t order one until I was 💯 percent sure of what truck I was going to get. The operators at work were asking when I would take the SuperDuty to work. See the first sentence of this paragraph, plus I want to keep it new as long as possible. Plus driving a SuperDuty in traffic doesn’t sound like much fun, as the 6.8L rumbles and slurps down fuel – it’s not Godzilla but it’s still an HD truck.
Higher gas prices and rising food costs are now a given following President Trump’s escalation with Iran. But if the administration moves to bomb Iranian power plants and bridges tonight, we must ask: how will Iran retaliate? While a conventional strike on U.S. soil is unlikely, a digital offensive against our “soft targets” is a much more credible threat.
The Vulnerability of Soft Targets
I am skeptical that Iran could successfully launch a drone or bomber against the continental United States. However, they could effectively engage in cyber-terrorism against secondary infrastructure—places where security is lax and monitoring software is outdated.
While most critical infrastructure is not directly connected to the internet, many systems maintain some level of connectivity for remote monitoring. Iranian hackers could exploit these links in water treatment facilities or small chemical plants to trigger equipment failure, mismanage processes, or incite public alarm.
The Strategy of Small-Scale Disruption
To be effective, cyber-terrorism doesn’t need to destroy a major power grid or cause mass casualties. It only needs to prove that a breach is possible. The most likely targets aren’t the high-security hubs, but the “forgotten” infrastructure:
Small, family-run chemical plants.
Rural water treatment facilities.
Aging, sub-100 megawatt coal-fired power plants.
In these environments, 9/11-era vigilance has faded. Security is often as weak as a “1234” password. By manipulating sensors or feeding false data to plant managers, hackers could trick operators into making catastrophic decisions that create dangerous conditions.
The Real Cost: Our Response
The true danger of Iranian cyber-attacks isn’t the physical damage; it is the cost of our own reaction. If Iran successfully “messes” with obscure systems, the ripple effects would be massive:
Economic Impact: Skyrocketing water rates and the cost of mandatory security upgrades.
Operational Strain: Temporary shutdowns of factories and utility plants.
Loss of Liberty: New restrictions on public access to lands, reservoirs, and power plant grounds.
We have only recently regained the public rights and transparency that were lost in the wake of September 11th. By targeting small-scale infrastructure, Iran could force the U.S. into a state of defensive overreaction—inflicting massive economic and social impact without firing a single shot on American soil.
“A vaguely worded warning from the Trump administration on Tuesday said that hackers backed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps had begun a series of cyberattacks on water and energy systems across the United States. But the warning, issued by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, known as CISA, did not name specific facilities that had been struck or say whether any damage had been done. It said only that the attacks were focusing on equipment made by a major American producer of computer controllers.
The report was issued in conjunction with the F.B.I., the National Security Agency and the Energy Department, and said that the purpose of the Iranian-affiliated attacks was “to cause disruptive effects within the United States.” Most of the equipment targeted by the group, the report said, were “programmable logic controllers” made by Rockwell Automation, which turns out a widely used line of what are known as Allen-Bradley controllers.”
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