Search Results for: photo rensselaer lake

October 26, 2019 Evening

For a while it was really beautiful at the Dickinson Hill Firetower at Grafton Lakes. Good but mostly faded colors but it depended on exactly which way I look. Then it clouded up a bit and things are most gray. Mostly cloudy ☁ and 50 degrees at the Dickinson Hill Firetower. There is a north breeze at 5 mph. πŸƒ.

Earlier in the day I spent a few hours canvassing for David Bissember πŸ“. That was a tough neighborhood where I was in with a lot of conservative Republicans but I did the best I could. Then this hike was a nice way to cap off the day with a three state view and a fair bit of color. πŸ‚ Didn’t Early Vote, the polling place looked packed, maybe on Monday after work.

I was thinking for a while I should have brought gear to spent the night β›Ί up at Green Mountain National Forest, especially after seeing the Bennington Monument and Stratton Mountain from the Firetower. But time is tight ⏳and it would involve setting up in darkness and taking camp down in the pouring rain β˜” in the morning. And now the clouds have pushed in, it’s not nearly as nice.

I am feeling pretty good this afternoon, 😊 but I’ll wait and see how it goes by morning. I have extra strength ibuprofen ready to go if I need it come morning and if this lasts into next week I’ll go to the doctor. 😷 So far the ibuprofen has been the only thing that’s made daily life bearable this week.⚠ I think it’s just a cold but I did get that tick bite 🐜 last Saturday and the migraines and body aches could very much also be a sign of Lyme disease. 🎯

Well folks, it will be getting dark in an hour and it’s 45 minutes back to my truck and I don’t really want to drive in rural Rensselaer County in the pitch dark. ⬜ So I take one last look around and head back. Walking 🚢 here from Grafton was better than driving 🚘, it certainly was real pretty but daylight won’t last long.

Swamp

Laws and Case Law

Highway Law Section 115-A:
Abandonment of County Highways.

Whenever a county road or part thereof constructed as part of the county road system deviates from the line of an existing town highway, or from the line of a former town highway within the limits of an incorporated village, as shown on the map of the county road system, the board of supervisors by resolution duly adopted upon the recommendation of the county superintendent of highways, and pursuant to a written agreement with the town board or village board of trustees, or in the event such an agreement cannot be reached with the approval of the commissioner of transportation, may abandon to the town or the incorporated village as the case may be for future maintenance, that part of the town highway or former town highway within the limits of an incorporated village not improved and modify the map of the county road system accordingly. The portion of any town highway or former town highway within the limits of an incorporated village excluded from the county road system shall be maintained by the town or village in which it is located.

Warning! Road Washed Out

Highway Law Section 205:
Highways Abandoned By Local Governments.

1. Every highway that shall not have been opened and worked within six years from the time it shall have been dedicated to the use of the public, or laid out, shall cease to be a highway; but the period during which any action or proceeding shall have been, or shall be pending in regard to any such highway, shall form no part of such six years; and every highway that shall not have been traveled or used as a highway for six years, shall cease to be a highway, and every public right of way that shall not have been used for said period shall be deemed abandoned as a right-of-way. The town superintendent with the written consent of a majority of the town board shall file, and cause to be recorded in the town clerk’s office of the town a written description, signed by him, and by said town board of each highway and public right-of-way so abandoned, and the same shall thereupon be discontinued.

2. There may also be a qualified abandonment of a highway under the following conditions and for the following purposes, to wit: Where it appears to the town superintendent and said town board, at any time, that a highway has not become wholly disused as aforesaid, but that it has not for two years next previous thereto, been usually traveled along the greater part thereof, by more than two vehicles daily, in addition to pedestrians and persons on horseback, and it shall also appear to the superintendent of highways of the county in which such town is situate that a qualified abandonment of such highway is proper and will not cause injustice or hardship to the owner or occupant of any lands adjoining such highway after such superintendent shall have held a public hearing thereon upon giving at least twenty days’ written notice to such owners and occupants of such lands of the time and place of such hearing, they shall file and cause to be recorded in the town clerk’s office a certificate containing a description of that portion of the highway partly disused as aforesaid and declaring a qualified abandonment thereof. The effect of such qualified abandonment, with respect to the portion of said highway described in the certificate, shall be as follows: It shall no longer be worked at the public expense; it shall not cease to be a highway for purposes of the public easement, by reason of such suspension of work thereon; no persons shall impair its use as a highway nor obstruct it, except as hereinafter provided, but no persons shall be required to keep any part of it in repair; wherever an owner or lessee of adjoining lands has the right to possession of other lands wholly or partly on the directly opposite side of the highway therefrom, he may construct and maintain across said highway a fence at each end of the area of highway which adjoins both of said opposite pieces of land, provided that each said cross fence must have a gate in the middle thereof at least ten feet in length, which gate must at all times be kept unlocked and supplied with a sufficient hasp or latch for keeping the same closed; all persons owning or using opposite lands, connected by such gates and fences, may use the portion of highway thus enclosed for pasturage; any traveler or other person who intentionally, or by wilful neglect, leaves such gate unlatched, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and the fact of leaving it unlatched shall be prima facie evidence of such intent or wilful neglect. Excepting as herein abrogated, all other general laws relating to highways shall apply to such partially abandoned highway. This section shall not apply to highways less than two rods in width unless it shall appear to the town superintendent at any time that such a highway has not, during the months of June to September inclusive of the two years next previous thereto, been usually traveled along the greater part thereof by more than ten pedestrians daily.

Any action or proceeding involving the abandonment or qualified abandonment of a highway made pursuant to this section must, in the case of abandonment, be commenced within one year from the date of filing by the town superintendent as provided in subdivision one of this section.

Old NY 30 Signs

Matter of Smigel v. Town of Rennselaer.

As seen on Google Scholar.

MATTER OF SMIGEL v. TOWN OF RENSSELAERVILLE

283 A.D.2d 863 (2001)

725 N.Y.S.2d 138

In the Matter of HENRIETTA SMIGEL, Respondent, v.
TOWN OF RENSSELAERVILLE et al., Appellants.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Third Department.

Decided May 24, 2001.

Mercure, J. P., Peters, Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Lahtinen, J.

Petitioner is the owner of land bordering the Camp Winsocki Road (hereinafter the road) located in respondent Town of Rensselaerville in Albany County, having acquired title to the property in 1986. In December 1995, petitioner requested that respondents abandon a portion of the road which she had barricaded at both ends in 1986, and which respondent Town Supervisor admitted had not been maintained by respondents for at least 20 years. Her request was continued for further study by the Town Board of the Town of Rensselaerville. In October 1999, petitioner and another petitioned respondents “to abandon a portion of its present easement to [the road].” In January 2000, after a public hearing, respondents refused to abandon the road and passed a resolution finding that the road had not been abandoned through disuse, ordering petitioner to remove all of her barricades, and making the road a seasonal road to be maintained from April 1 to December 1.

In January 2000, petitioner commenced this combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and action for declaratory judgment seeking a judgment clearing her title “as to the portion of her property previously subjected to an easement for the highway,” injunctive relief prohibiting respondents from removing her barriers on the road and trespassing on her property and an order directing respondents to file a certification of abandonment. Respondents answered, asserting that the petition/ complaint failed to state a cause of action.

The parties submitted numerous affidavits and documentary evidence in support of their respective positions and, in April 2000, Supreme Court determined that because no photographs had been submitted by either party, the matter could not be summarily decided, and it therefore set a hearing date to determine whether recreational travel “follows the `lines of the ancient street.'” When the parties appeared on the scheduled hearing date, they were informed that the hearing had been canceled and were directed to leave any photographs that they had with the court for review. Both parties submitted photographs depicting the present condition of the road.* On May 26, 2000, Supreme Court granted the petition/complaint and declared the road to be abandoned. Respondents appeal and we reverse.

Highway Law § 205 (1) provides, in relevant part, that “every highway that shall not have been traveled or used as a highway for six years, shall cease to be a highway.” Once a highway exists, it is presumed to continue until the contrary is demonstrated and the presumption is in favor of continuance (see, City of Cohoes v Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 134 N.Y. 397, 407; Matter of Van Aken v Town of Roxbury,211 A.D.2d 863, 865, lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 812). The burden of establishing abandonment is on the party claiming that the highway has been abandoned (see, Matter of Faigle v Macumber,169 A.D.2d 914, 915). In that regard, a municipality’s intention regarding a road is irrelevant (see, Daetsch v Taber,149 A.D.2d 864, 865) and its failure to maintain a road does not mean that the road ceases to be a highway (see, O’Leary v Town of Trenton,172 Misc.2d 447, 450). A determination of abandonment of a road by nonuse is a factual determination (see, e.g., Coleman v Village of Head of Harbor,163 A.D.2d 456, 458, lv denied76 N.Y.2d 768; Holland v Superintendent of Highways of Town of Smithtown,73 Misc.2d 851, 852).

It is undisputed that respondents never filed a certificate of abandonment to officially abandon the road. Likewise, it is clear that respondents did not maintain the road nor had the road been used by motor vehicles for more than the statutory six-year period. The narrow question left to be decided after submission of the photographs was framed by Supreme Court as follows: “[i]f the road entrance has been obstructed, and it is unpaved and overgrown with weeds, trees, bushes and shrubs, as claimed by petitioner, making travel along the `lines of the ancient street’ improbable, then even the most active recreational and seasonal use propounded by [respondents], that of snowmobilers, hikers, and bicyclists, would fall short of being highway use” (citing O’Leary v Town of Trenton, supra, at 451; Holland v Superintendent of Highways of Town of Smithtown, supra, at 853).

We find that Supreme Court correctly set forth the applicable law regarding abandonment of a highway through nonuse. After reviewing the photographs submitted by the parties, Supreme Court made the factual determination that the “photographs reveal many years of non-use as a highway” and “it is apparent that the road entrance has often been obstructed, preventing travel along the `lines of the ancient street,'” and summarily granted the relief sought by petitioner. We agree that the photographs show a number of barricades located at various points along the unpaved road, but they also show an ancient road, not overgrown with weeds, trees, bushes or shrubs, but clearly discernible, and not “virtually indistinguishable from the surrounding wooded area” (Matter of Faigle v Macumber, supra, at 916). Indeed, the pictures appear to depict a clearly defined, unpaved roadway through an area overgrown with brush and thick woods on both sides, precluding travel other than on the road, except with extreme difficulty. Our review of the photographs suggests to us that travel over this road by such disparate groups as snowmobilers, bicyclists, cross-country skiers and pedestrians would follow “along the lines of an existing street” (Town of Leray v New York Cent. R. R. Co., 226 N.Y. 109, 113). Moreover, respondents’ submissions reflect that although petitioner had barricaded the road on a number of occasions, those obstructions were either removed or knocked down so as to access its year-round recreational use. Therefore, the recreational uses found by Supreme Court may be sufficient to preclude a finding of abandonment of the road by nonuse. In our opinion, summary judgment should not have been granted in this matter in the absence of clarifying testimony as to the condition and use of the roadway.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs, and matter remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court’s decision.

Red Dirt Road

MATTER OF VAN AKEN v. Town of Roxbury, 211 AD 2d 863.

As found on Google Scholar.

211 A.D.2d 863 (1995) 621 N.Y.S.2d 204 In the Matter of Millard Van Aken et al., Appellants, v. Town of Roxbury et al., Respondents

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Third Department.

January 5, 1995 Mikoll, Crew III, Yesawich Jr. and Peters, JJ., concur.

Cardona, P. J.

Petitioners are property owners with residences located in the Town of Roxbury, Delaware County, which extends beyond the roadway presently maintained by respondents as a Town road. On October 20, 1992, petitioners wrote to respondent Town of Roxbury requesting maintenance of the road segment at issue. On November 10, 1992, the Town Attorney responded by requesting evidence that the segment was a Town road. The attorney for petitioners wrote back indicating the reasons the particular segment was a Town highway. When no response was received, petitioner Millard Van Aken asked the Town Supervisor about the status of the request and was told that the Town Attorney was supposed to respond but had been delayed by other matters.

On March 4, 1993, the Town Attorney informed petitioners that if the segment was a Town road it had been abandoned. On July 1, 1993, petitioners commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to compel the Town and respondent Town Superintendent of Highways to maintain the road segment pursuant to Highway Law § 140. In their answer, respondents asserted that the proceeding was barred by the four-month Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 217 [1]). Supreme Court held that the Town was required to make a final binding determination on petitioners’ request before CPLR article 78 review was possible and the Town Attorney’s letter of March 4, 1993 did not constitute a binding determination. Unable to determine 864*864 if or when the Town had taken official action on petitioners’ request, Supreme Court dismissed the petition as either untimely or premature. By letter to the Town Board dated September 30, 1993, petitioners sought a formal vote on their request for maintenance. On October 11, 1993, the Town Board denied their request. Thereafter, petitioners moved for reconsideration, which Supreme Court denied.

Initially, we note that Supreme Court relied upon our decision in Treadway v Town Bd. (163 AD2d 637) in determining the Statute of Limitations issue. We treated the declaratory judgment action in Treadway as a mandamus to review for limitation purposes. However, the present proceeding is in the nature of mandamus to compel rather than mandamus to review. In mandamus to review, the court examines an administrative action involving the exercise of discretion for which no quasi-judicial hearing is required. On the other hand, in mandamus to compel an agency or officer’s performance of a ministerial act, the court examines whether the petitioner possesses a clear legal right to the relief sought and whether the agency or officer has a corresponding nondiscretionary duty to grant the relief requested (see, CPLR 7803 [1]; Matter of Scherbyn v Wayne-Finger Lakes Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 77 N.Y.2d 753, 757; see also, Matter of Armstrong v Centerville Fire Co., 83 N.Y.2d 937, 939; Matter of Legal Aid Socy. v Scheinman, 53 N.Y.2d 12, 16).

In Treadway (supra), review was sought of an administrative action in the form of a declaration by the Town Board that the disputed road was not a public road. We held that the four-month Statute of Limitations began to run from that final binding determination. In this case, there is no question but that petitioners made a demand for maintenance to the Town on October 20, 1992. The March 4, 1993 letter from the Town Attorney[*] conveyed the Town’s refusal to perform its ministerial duty to maintain the road (see, Highway Law § 140). Accordingly, the four-month Statute of Limitations began to run at that time (see, CPLR 217 [1]; Matter of Waterside Assocs. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 72 N.Y.2d 1009, 1010; Matter of De Milio v Borghard, 55 N.Y.2d 216, 220; Matter of Pfingst v Levitt, 44 AD2d 157, 159, lv denied 34 N.Y.2d 518; see also, Siegel, NY Prac § 566, at 887 [2d ed]). Therefore, the petition filed on July 1, 1993 was 865*865 within the applicable period of limitations and the proceeding was timely commenced.

Having established that petitioners’ proceeding was timely commenced, we turn now to the merits of their petition. While it is clear that the Town has a legal duty to maintain Town roads (see, Highway Law § 140) and can be compelled to perform such a duty (see, People ex rel. Schau v McWilliams, 185 N.Y. 92, 100), the parties disagree on the fundamental question of whether the road segment at issue was abandoned by the Town and therefore no longer a Town highway. It is undisputed that no certificate of abandonment was ever filed by the Town, as provided for in Highway Law § 205. “Once a road becomes a highway, it remains such until the contrary is shown” (Matter of Shawangunk Holdings v Superintendent of Highways of Town of Shawangunk, 101 AD2d 905, 907; see, Matter of Flacke v Strack, 98 AD2d 881). A highway will be deemed abandoned if it is not traveled or used as a highway for six years (see, Highway Law § 205). The burden of proving such abandonment rests, in this case, with the Town (see, Matter of Shawangunk Holdings v Superintendent of Highways of Town of Shawangunk, supra, at 907).

Respondents have failed to meet their burden of proving that the road segment at issue was not traveled or used as a highway for six years. Although respondents argue that abandonment is shown because of a period of nonmaintenance in excess of 30 years, the law is clear that a highway does not cease to be a highway merely because the Town has failed to service it (see, Hewitt v Town of Scipio, 32 AD2d 734, affd 26 N.Y.2d 934). Nor is it relevant whether the Town intended an abandonment, as it is the substantive facts themselves which establish abandonment (see, Daetsch v Taber, 149 AD2d 864, 865). Petitioners have introduced uncontroverted cartographic and testimonial evidence to support their contention that the road has been and continues to be regularly used and traveled as a highway. We, therefore, find that no genuine issue of abandonment exists and that the contested road segment continues to be a Town road.

Ordered that the judgment and order are reversed, on the law, with costs, and petition granted.

Betty Brook Road

Holland v. SUPT. OF HIGHWAYS, 73 Misc. 2d 851

This case also from Google Scholar.

73 Misc.2d 851 (1973)

Eugene W. Holland, Plaintiff,
v.
Superintendent of Highways of the Town of Smithtown et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Nassau County.

April 3, 1973 Donner, Fagelson & Hariton for plaintiff. H. Paul King for defendants.

BERTRAM HARNETT, J.

Eugene W. Holland owns property in Smithtown, New York, bordering to the east on a plot of land about 50 feet wide sometimes known as the “Old Smithtown to St. Johnsland Road”. In this declaratory judgment action brought against the Town of Smithtown and its Superintendent of Highways, Mr. Holland now seeks, by summary judgment motion, a declaration that he owns the westerly one half of the land by virtue of State and town abandonment of 852*852 it. Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (subd. [a], par. 10).

Despite some minor disputation, the parties essentially agree that the subject land is not used as a public road for motor vehicular traffic. It is unpaved, blocked off on both ends, and substantially overgrown with trees and shrubbery. Pedestrians and bicyclers occasionally use it as a sort of pathway or shortcut. No material issue of fact appears to prevent a summary disposition. (Sachs v. Real Estate Capital Corp., 31 A D 2d 916; Law Research Serv. v. Honeywell, 31 A D 2d 900.)

Subdivision 1 of section 205 of the Highway Law provides in pertinent part: “Every highway that shall not have been traveled or used as a highway for six years, shall cease to be a highway * * * The town superintendent with the written consent of a majority of the town board shall file, and cause to be recorded in the town clerk’s office of the town a written description, signed by him, and by said town board of each highway and public right-of-way so abandoned, and the same shall thereupon be discontinued”.

The statute does not specify any procedures to be followed in town ascertainment of an abandoned highway, in contrast to the notice and hearing required for a “qualified abandonment” finding. (See Highway Law, § 205, subd. 2.) Any route once declared and used as a highway is presumed to continue as such until shown, by the party seeking a contrary declaration, to have been abandoned. (Hallenbeck v. State of New York, 59 Misc 2d 475, 480; Stupnicki v. Southern New York Fish & Game Assn., 41 Misc 2d 266, affd. 19 A D 2d 921.) The focal determination is essentially a factual one. And, nonuse of only a portion of a highway, while the rest continues to be utilized as a highway, does not result in abandonment, even of the unused portion. (Bovee v. State of New York, 28 A D 2d 1165.)

While at one time the Smithtown to St. Johnsland Road may have been heavily traveled, after its completion in 1917, the portion abutting Mr. Holland’s land has been in substantial disuse since a realignment of the Jericho Turnpike intersection in 1930. The evidence is overwhelming for much more than the past six years the land was not used as a highway. Petitioner and 16 residents in the surrounding neighborhood so attest in sworn statements and the photographs submitted clearly indicate lack of highway activity for many years. Indeed, the town itself uses the easterly half of the old road land as part of a park.

853*853While use as a highway upon appropriate circumstances may encompass less than contemporary expressway traffic of trailer trucks and high-speed automobiles, even the most active use posited by the town, that of pedestrian and bicycle passage, falls far short of being highway use. (Town of Leray v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 226 N.Y. 109, 113.) Were this activity to create a public easement, the ownership rights of the adjoining fee owner would still remain unaffected. “It is the rule that where an easement only exists in the public that upon abandonment the fee is presumptively in the owners of the adjoining land.” (Stupnicki v. Southern New York Fish & Game Assn., 41 Misc 2d 266, 271, affd. 19 A D 2d 921, supra).

As Judge CARDOZO observed in Barnes v. Midland R. R. Term. Co. (218 N.Y. 91, 98): “If for six years the highway remains closed with the acquiescence of the public, there is an extinguishment of the public right”.

One peculiar wrinkle remains. After the State apparently realized that this portion of the “Old Smithtown to St. Johnsland Road” would be unused because of the mentioned realignment, the Commissioner of the Department of Works, Division of Highways, issued an official order dated July 19, 1932, substituting as part of the official State highway the realigned section for the abandoned section, stating that the unused portion was to be “TURNED OVER to the COUNTY OF SUFFOLK for future maintenance and repair”. The town asserts, in seeking dismissal, that this directive adversely affects Mr. Holland’s fee interest, and further requires the County of Suffolk to be joined as a necessary party.

Mr. Holland’s fee interest, clearly established by his surveyor’s title search of deeds going back over one hundred years, is not disturbed by the State’s order which relates solely to maintenance and care of the discontinued stretch of highway, not to the underlying ownership. Under the State highway system, created in 1908, the State does not own its roads unless prescribed condemnation procedures are first completed. (L. 1908, ch. 330; Highway Law, § 30.) Here, there is no indication of any prior State condemnation. When the Department of Works’ order was issued in 1932, the State’s interest was merely that of a public right of way, limited to its entitlement and obligation to maintain the roads. Accordingly, even if the Commissioner had conveyance power, all that could have been “turned over” to Suffolk County in 1932 was the State’s maintenance right. In this proceeding to determine ownership rights in the land, the county is not, therefore, a necessary or 854*854 indispensable party, particularly where, upon abandonment declaration, and resulting ownership and use vesting in the adjoining owner, he would then assume use, control and maintenance of the land.

Moreover, the purported deed from the county to the town dated July 28, 1930, transferring the 15 feet on each side of the subject parcel to the town only for use as a park or plaza, does not appear to affect the easterly side of the road, not owned at any time by the town. In any event, it could not convey a fee interest that the county did not have.

Finally, the lack of any formal application for a town certificate is not at this stage fatal. The abandonment exists, independent of the town certification, a purely ministerial act. (See People ex rel. De Groat v. Marlette, 94 App. Div. 592, 594.) There are no procedures set forth in the statute indicating who may obtain, and how, the “consent” to abandonment by the Town Board. (Highway Law, § 205, subd. 1.) No reason is suggested why a court, with the town and its Highway Department fully and fairly before it, may not declare the respective rights of the parties so as to resolve the controversy. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a prerequisite in an action for declaratory judgment. (Northern Operating Corp. v. Town of Ramapo, 31 A D 2d 822.) Moreover, the town, by fully appearing here and expressing its opposition on the merits in the many forms indicated, has demonstrated that a remand of Mr. Holland’s application to the town would be a futile and superfluous avenue, and has therefore rendered the dispute ripe for judicial determination.

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and a declaratory judgment shall be issued declaring the road land abutting plaintiff’s property to be abandoned.

Settle judgment on notice.

A look at the various laws and a few cases relating to the abandonment of highways in NY State.

They Paved Paradise and Put Up a Parking Lot

9824448813_26ef2a3f20_oA few months ago I stumbled across this photo on the AlbanyGroup on Flickr. It is of the Northway Exit 1, shortly after it was constructed in the mid-1960s, prior to construction of Crossgates Mall.

The the Pine Bush at that time seems largely wild, although there are some newer housing subdivisions in the distance. The Northway and Thruway Interchange seem somewhat out of place, and once can only imagine what these wild lands must have looked like before these superhighways were overlaid over this area that once was mostly dirt roads, the wilds at the outskirts of the city.

Within a decade, much of this land would be filled in with Washington Avenue Extension’s many strip malls and Crossgates Mall. These wild lands would be lost, at least temporarily to parking lots, suburban office buildings, and shopping centers.

Similar scenes can be seen across more rural portions of New York. What happened in the Albany Pine Bush can happen anywhere.

Look now and speak up before it’s gone.

An old-1960s photo of the Northway and Rensselaer Lake reminds us what the Pine Bush looked like before it's heavy development, and is a warning for future generations.

Went Out to the Albany Pine Bush for A Bit This Afternoon

Decided to go out to the Albany Pine Bush for a bit this afternoon. Did a short hike in the Blueberry Hill barrens, and also Rensselaer Lake. I had heard the the Pine Bush commission was chopping down some old growth White Pine Trees, so I wanted to take a look.

I didn’t see much in the way of cutting White Pines, but I didn’t venture deep into the the forbidden zone. I primarily saw cutting off of trash species, primarily black locust and aspen. Who knows though, I wouldn’t be shocked if the Pine Bush commission is cutting aspen too.

A bit chilly out, but I watch the sun set a bit from Blueberry Hill before going back to the truck.

Twin Pines

What Does 100 Miles from the Rapp Road Landfill Look Like?

About a year ago, in the Capital Region Solid Waste Plan, the City of Albany proposed creating a mega-solid waste authority to manage the Solid Waste for most of the Eastern Half of New York State. The plan specifically called for creating a regional authority — to service up to nine counties, and cover an area of 100 miles from the center point of the Rapp Road Landfill.

So I decided to make a map, and run some numbers…

Along the Lake

100 square miles equals roughly 30,500 square miles, with 21,500 sq miles in New York State and 9,000 sq miles out of State — primarily Southern Vermont, but also most of Western Massachussets, roughly 3/4th of Connecicut, and part of Pennsylvania in the Poconos.

In contrast to 30,500 square miles, Adirondack Park “Blue Line” covers roughly 9,100 sq miles in NY State and the Catskill Park “Blue Line” covers roughly 1,100 sq miles. That includes all land within those parks, publicly and privately owned.

That area, within NY State, covers an area were 2,957,993 persons reported residing in the 2010 census.

That is 2.95 million people, or almost 3 million people, a population greater then Manhattan at 1.5 million persons, and even Brooklyn at 2.5 million.

While no one town or city in the proposed in Authorty is particularly large — the City of Albany is the largest population center at 97,856 followed by Colonie at 81,591, the reality is those numbers add up, when you include the 406 towns and cities in NY State that fall within the 100 mile distance from the Rapp Road Landfill.

Large Cities and Towns in Proposed Authority.

Town /City Population
Albany city 97,856
Colonie town 81,591
Schenectady city 66,135
Utica city 62,235
Troy city 50,129
Poughkeepsie town 43,341
Cortlandt town 41,592
Monroe town 39,912
Clifton Park town 36,705
Yorktown town 36,081
Guilderland town 35,303
Carmel town 34,305
Rome city 33,725
Bethlehem town 33,656
Poughkeepsie city 32,736
Warwick town 32,065
Newburgh town 29,801
Glenville town 29,480
Rotterdam town 29,094

All Towns and Cities in NY State within 100 miles of Rapp Road Landfill.

Here is entire list of towns partially or wholely contained in the proposed jurisdiction of the Albany Solid Waste Authority (including large cities and towns listed above)…

Town /City Population Area (sq mi) Pop sq/mi
Albany city 97,856 21 4659.8
Colonie town 81,591 57 1431.4
Schenectady city 66,135 10 6613.5
Utica city 62,235 16 3889.7
Troy city 50,129 11 4557.2
Poughkeepsie town 43,341 31 1398.1
Cortlandt town 41,592 49 848.8
Monroe town 39,912 21 1900.6
Clifton Park town 36,705 50 734.1
Yorktown town 36,081 39 925.2
Guilderland town 35,303 58 608.7
Carmel town 34,305 40 857.6
Rome city 33,725 75 449.7
Bethlehem town 33,656 50 673.1
Poughkeepsie city 32,736 5 6547.2
Warwick town 32,065 105 305.4
Newburgh town 29,801 46 647.8
Glenville town 29,480 50 589.6
Rotterdam town 29,094 36 808.2
East Fishkill town 29,029 57 509.3
Newburgh city 28,866 4 7216.5
Middletown city 28,086 5 5617.2
Queensbury town 27,901 64 436.0
Wallkill town 27,426 62 442.4
Wappinger town 27,048 28 966.0
Saratoga Springs city 26,586 28 949.5
New Windsor town 25,244 36 701.2
Kingston city 23,893 8 2986.6
Peekskill city 23,583 5 4716.6
Montgomery town 22,606 51 443.3
New Hartford town 22,166 25 886.6
Fishkill town 22,107 32 690.8
Niskayuna town 21,781 15 1452.1
Hyde Park town 21,571 39 553.1
Halfmoon town 21,535 33 652.6
Somers town 20,434 32 638.6
Saugerties town 19,482 67 290.8
Whitestown town 18,667 27 691.4
Amsterdam city 18,620 6 3103.3
Milton town 18,575 35 530.7
Southeast town 18,404 34 541.3
Blooming Grove town 18,028 35 515.1
East Greenbush town 16,473 24 686.4
Wilton town 16,173 35 462.1
Cohoes city 16,168 4 4042.0
La Grange town 15,730 40 393.3
Gloversville city 15,665 5 3133.0
Beacon city 15,541 4 3885.3
Thompson town 15,308 87 176.0
Stony Point town 15,059 31 485.8
Malta town 14,765 31 476.3
Moreau town 14,728 43 342.5
Glens Falls city 14,700 3 4900.0
Beekman town 14,621 30 487.4
Shawangunk town 14,332 56 255.9
New Paltz town 14,003 34 411.9
Oneonta city 13,901 4 3475.3
Goshen town 13,687 44 311.1
Kent town 13,507 43 314.1
German Flatts town 13,258 34 389.9
Wawarsing town 13,157 133 98.9
Fallsburg town 12,870 79 162.9
Schodack town 12,794 63 203.1
Kingsbury town 12,671 40 316.8
Cornwall town 12,646 28 451.6
Highlands town 12,492 33 378.5
Lewisboro town 12,411 29 428.0
Ulster town 12,327 28 440.3
Mamakating town 12,085 98 123.3
North Greenbush town 12,075 18 670.8
Patterson town 12,023 32 375.7
Chester town 11,981 87 137.7
Chester town 11,981 25 479.2
Brunswick town 11,941 44 271.4
Putnam Valley town 11,809 42 281.2
Catskill town 11,775 64 184.0
Oneida city 11,393 22 517.9
Woodbury town 11,353 37 306.8
Red Hook town 11,319 40 283.0
Lloyd town 10,863 33 329.2
Plattekill town 10,499 35 300.0
Kirkland town 10,315 33 312.6
Watervliet city 10,254 1 10254.0
Herkimer town 10,175 32 318.0
Liberty town 9,885 80 123.6
Ballston town 9,776 30 325.9
Pleasant Valley town 9,672 33 293.1
Philipstown town 9,662 51 189.5
Rensselaer city 9,392 3 3130.7
Crawford town 9,316 40 232.9
Lenox town 9,122 36 253.4
Esopus town 9,041 41 220.5
Marcy town 8,982 33 272.2
North Elba town 8,957 156 57.4
Coxsackie town 8,918 38 234.7
Marlborough town 8,808 26 338.8
Johnstown city 8,743 4 2185.8
Dover town 8,699 56 155.3
New Scotland town 8,648 57 151.7
Sand Lake town 8,530 36 236.9
Kinderhook town 8,498 32 265.6
Pawling town 8,463 45 188.1
Waterford town 8,423 7 1203.3
Stillwater town 8,287 43 192.7
Deerpark town 7,901 67 117.9
Greenfield town 7,775 67 116.0
Schaghticoke town 7,679 51 150.6
Frankfort town 7,636 36 212.1
Rhinebeck town 7,548 39 193.5
Coeymans town 7,418 53 140.0
Rochester town 7,313 89 82.2
Wawayanda town 7,266 35 207.6
Norwich city 7,190 2 3595.0
Johnstown town 7,098 71 100.0
Mount Hope town 7,018 25 280.7
Hoosick town 6,924 63 109.9
Hudson city 6,713 2 3356.5
Hamilton town 6,690 41 163.2
Cairo town 6,670 60 111.2
Granville town 6,669 56 119.1
Cobleskill town 6,625 30 220.8
Corinth town 6,531 58 112.6
Mayfield town 6,495 64 101.5
Lee town 6,486 45 144.1
Fort Edward town 6,371 27 236.0
Hurley town 6,314 35 180.4
Verona town 6,293 69 91.2
Windsor town 6,274 93 67.5
Fort Ann town 6,190 111 55.8
Westmoreland town 6,138 43 142.7
Duanesburg town 6,122 71 86.2
Rosendale town 6,075 20 303.8
Claverack town 6,021 47 128.1
Woodstock town 5,884 67 87.8
Sidney town 5,774 50 115.5
Pittstown town 5,735 64 89.6
Gardiner town 5,713 43 132.9
Saratoga town 5,674 42 135.1
Marbletown town 5,607 55 101.9
Greene town 5,604 75 74.7
Walton town 5,576 97 57.5
Amsterdam town 5,566 30 185.5
Hamptonburgh town 5,561 26 213.9
Vienna town 5,440 95 57.3
Vernon town 5,408 37 146.2
Ghent town 5,402 45 120.0
Broadalbin town 5,260 39 134.9
Eaton town 5,255 45 116.8
Colesville town 5,232 79 66.2
Oneonta town 5,229 33 158.5
Mechanicville city 5,196 0
Delhi town 5,117 64 80.0
North Salem town 5,104 22 232.0
Northumberland town 5,087 32 159.0
Ticonderoga town 5,042 88 57.3
Little Falls city 4,946 3 1648.7
Greenwich town 4,942 44 112.3
Union Vale town 4,877 37 131.8
Moriah town 4,798 71 67.6
Nassau town 4,789 45 106.4
Washington town 4,741 58 81.7
Boonville town 4,555 72 63.3
Poestenkill town 4,530 32 141.6
Trenton town 4,498 43 104.6
Minisink town 4,490 23 195.2
Amenia town 4,436 43 103.2
Olive town 4,419 65 68.0
Paris town 4,411 31 142.3
Unadilla town 4,392 46 95.5
Minden town 4,297 51 84.3
Deerfield town 4,273 33 129.5
Bethel town 4,255 90 47.3
Greenport town 4,165 20 208.3
Charlton town 4,133 32 129.2
Chatham town 4,128 53 77.9
Warrensburg town 4,094 64 64.0
Athens town 4,089 28 146.0
Sherburne town 4,048 43 94.1
Whitehall town 4,042 58 69.7
Norwich town 3,998 42 95.2
Oxford town 3,901 60 65.0
Otsego town 3,900 59 66.1
Mohawk town 3,844 35 109.8
Stanford town 3,823 50 76.5
Floyd town 3,819 34 112.3
Argyle town 3,782 57 66.4
Rockland town 3,775 95 39.7
Middletown town 3,750 97 38.7
Middleburgh town 3,746 49 76.4
Greenville town 3,739 39 95.9
Greenville town 3,739 30 124.6
Canajoharie town 3,730 43 86.7
Livingston town 3,646 38 95.9
Perth town 3,646 26 140.2
Tuxedo town 3,624 49 74.0
Copake town 3,615 42 86.1
Neversink town 3,557 86 41.4
Galway town 3,545 45 78.8
Lake George town 3,515 32 109.8
Schuyler town 3,420 40 85.5
New Baltimore town 3,370 43 78.4
Westerlo town 3,361 58 57.9
White Creek town 3,356 48 69.9
Lake Luzerne town 3,347 54 62.0
Manheim town 3,334 29 115.0
Bainbridge town 3,308 34 97.3
Palatine town 3,240 41 79.0
Hancock town 3,224 161 20.0
Schoharie town 3,205 29 110.5
Otego town 3,115 45 69.2
Shandaken town 3,085 120 25.7
Sherrill city 3,071 2 1535.5
Callicoon town 3,057 48 63.7
Milford town 3,044 47 64.8
North East town 3,031 43 70.5
Annsville town 3,012 60 50.2
Madison town 3,008 41 73.4
Davenport town 2,965 52 57.0
Guilford town 2,922 61 47.9
Stephentown town 2,903 58 50.1
Afton town 2,851 46 62.0
Stockport town 2,815 13 216.5
Berne town 2,794 64 43.7
Hunter town 2,732 90 30.4
Durham town 2,725 49 55.6
Salem town 2,715 52 52.2
Florida town 2,696 51 52.9
Knox town 2,692 41 65.7
New Berlin town 2,682 46 58.3
Delaware town 2,670 35 76.3
Northampton town 2,670 34 78.5
St. Johnsville town 2,631 17 154.8
Green Island town 2,620 0
Richmondville town 2,610 30 87.0
Russia town 2,587 60 43.1
Sangerfield town 2,561 30 85.4
Brookfield town 2,545 78 32.6
Highland town 2,530 52 48.7
Glen town 2,507 39 64.3
Roxbury town 2,502 87 28.8
Pine Plains town 2,473 31 79.8
Lumberland town 2,468 49 50.4
Laurens town 2,424 42 57.7
Franklin town 2,411 81 29.8
Sanford town 2,407 91 26.5
Johnsburg town 2,395 206 11.6
Richfield town 2,388 32 74.6
Milan town 2,370 36 65.8
Easton town 2,336 63 37.1
Bolton town 2,326 90 25.8
New Lebanon town 2,305 35 65.9
Newport town 2,302 32 71.9
Hartford town 2,269 43 52.8
Stamford town 2,267 48 47.2
Worcester town 2,220 46 48.3
Marshall town 2,131 32 66.6
Grafton town 2,130 45 47.3
Princetown town 2,115 24 88.1
Middlefield town 2,114 63 33.6
Hartwick town 2,110 40 52.8
Stockbridge town 2,103 31 67.8
Winfield town 2,086 23 90.7
Colchester town 2,077 142 14.6
Esperance town 2,076 20 103.8
Hadley town 2,048 41 50.0
Stuyvesant town 2,027 26 78.0
Crown Point town 2,024 81 25.0
Cambridge town 2,021 36 56.1
Augusta town 2,020 27 74.8
Lincoln town 2,012 25 80.5
Providence town 1,995 45 44.3
Nelson town 1,980 44 45.0
Clermont town 1,965 19 103.4
Salisbury town 1,958 108 18.1
Germantown town 1,954 13 150.3
Western town 1,951 54 36.1
Carlisle town 1,948 34 57.3
Remsen town 1,929 36 53.6
Hillsdale town 1,927 48 40.1
Oppenheim town 1,924 56 34.4
Maryland town 1,897 51 37.2
Watson town 1,881 116 16.2
Berlin town 1,880 59 31.9
Morris town 1,878 39 48.2
Hebron town 1,853 56 33.1
Sharon town 1,846 39 47.3
Rensselaerville town 1,843 62 29.7
Edmeston town 1,826 44 41.5
Webb town 1,807 484 3.7
Plymouth town 1,804 42 43.0
Jackson town 1,800 37 48.6
Butternuts town 1,786 53 33.7
Leyden town 1,785 33 54.1
North Norwich town 1,783 28 63.7
Seward town 1,763 36 49.0
Fenner town 1,726 31 55.7
Root town 1,715 51 33.6
Deposit town 1,712 44 38.9
Canaan town 1,710 36 47.5
Windham town 1,703 45 37.8
Ashland town 1,695 25 67.8
Ephratah town 1,682 39 43.1
Kortright town 1,675 62 27.0
Gallatin town 1,668 39 42.8
Coventry town 1,655 48 34.5
Schroon town 1,654 141 11.7
Austerlitz town 1,654 48 34.5
Fairfield town 1,627 41 39.7
DeRuyter town 1,589 31 51.3
Little Falls town 1,587 22 72.1
Columbia town 1,580 35 45.1
Harpersfield town 1,577 42 37.5
Ancram town 1,573 42 37.5
Wright town 1,539 28 55.0
Forestport town 1,535 78 19.7
Meredith town 1,529 58 26.4
Petersburgh town 1,525 41 37.2
West Turin town 1,524 102 14.9
Bridgewater town 1,522 23 66.2
Tusten town 1,515 48 31.6
Litchfield town 1,513 30 50.4
Fulton town 1,442 65 22.2
Jefferson town 1,410 43 32.8
Horicon town 1,389 71 19.6
Lewis town 1,382 65 21.3
Charleston town 1,373 42 32.7
Cochecton town 1,372 37 37.1
Pittsfield town 1,366 38 35.9
Springfield town 1,358 45 30.2
Indian Lake town 1,352 266 5.1
Lebanon town 1,332 43 31.0
Smithville town 1,330 50 26.6
Hamden town 1,323 60 22.1
Masonville town 1,320 54 24.4
Westport town 1,312 66 19.9
Taghkanic town 1,310 40 32.8
Gilboa town 1,307 59 22.2
Andes town 1,301 112 11.6
Smithfield town 1,288 24 53.7
Smyrna town 1,280 42 30.5
Tompkins town 1,247 104 12.0
Lyonsdale town 1,227 70 17.5
Cherry Valley town 1,223 40 30.6
Thurman town 1,219 92 13.3
Edinburg town 1,214 67 18.1
Caroga town 1,205 54 22.3
Greig town 1,199 94 12.8
Elizabethtown town 1,163 83 14.0
Summit town 1,148 37 31.0
Warren town 1,143 38 30.1
Burlington town 1,140 45 25.3
New Lisbon town 1,114 44 25.3
Keene town 1,105 156 7.1
Steuben town 1,100 42 26.2
Otselic town 1,054 38 27.7
Preston town 1,044 35 29.8
Danube town 1,039 29 35.8
Fremont town 1,008 51 19.8
Ohio town 1,002 307 3.3
Exeter town 987 32 30.8
Columbus town 975 37 26.4
Georgetown town 974 40 24.4
Broome town 973 48 20.3
Jewett town 953 50 19.1
Hampton town 938 22 42.6
Plainfield town 915 29 31.6
Kingston town 889 7 127.0
McDonough town 886 39 22.7
Westford town 868 33 26.3
Day town 856 69 12.4
Forestburgh town 819 56 14.6
Minerva town 809 160 5.1
Lexington town 805 79 10.2
Pitcher town 803 28 28.7
Lake Pleasant town 781 198 3.9
Stony Creek town 767 83 9.2
Norway town 762 35 21.8
Stark town 757 31 24.4
Clinton town 737 38 19.4
Conesville town 734 40 18.4
Long Lake town 711 449 1.6
Roseboom town 711 33 21.5
Prattsville town 700 19 36.8
Hague town 699 80 8.7
Ava town 676 37 18.3
Wells town 674 177 3.8
Dresden town 652 54 12.1
Bovina town 633 44 14.4
Stratford town 610 76 8.0
Putnam town 609 35 17.4
Pharsalia town 593 39 15.2
Denning town 551 105 5.2
Bleecker town 533 59 9.0
Newcomb town 436 233 1.9
Hope town 403 41 9.8
Lincklaen town 396 26 15.2
Blenheim town 377 34 11.1
Decatur town 353 20 17.7
Inlet town 333 66 5.0
Arietta town 304 329 0.9
Halcott town 258 23 11.2
North Hudson town 240 185 1.3
Hardenburgh town 238 80 3.0
Benson town 192 83 2.3
Morehouse town 86 194 0.4
Total 2,957,993 21,462 386.0

Section 212 of the State Highway Law

Section 212 of Highway Law.

S 212. Changing location of highways over certain lands owned and occupied by the state. 1. If a highway passes over or through lands wholly owned and occupied by the state, the location of such portion of such highway as passes through such lands may be altered and changed, or the same may be abandoned or the use thereof as a highway discontinued with the consent and approval of the state authority having jurisdiction or control over such lands by an order directing such change in location, abandonment or discontinuance. Such order shall contain a description of that portion of the highway the location of which has been changed, abandoned or discontinued, and a description of the new location thereof, if any, and shall be filed in the office of the state authority having control of such lands.

 Relatively Smooth Section of Crane Pond Road

John J. Kelly v. DEC Commissioner Jorling (1990).

You can read the court case online.

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT

November 21, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF JOHN J. KELLY, APPELLANT,
v.
THOMAS C. JORLING, AS COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, RESPONDENT

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Dominick J. Viscardi, J.), entered March 29, 1990 in Essex County in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, which dismissed a petition to prohibit respondent from directing closure of a portion of a road traversing State-owned land in Essex County.

Roemer & Featherstonhaugh (E. Guy Roemer of counsel), for appellant.

Robert Abrams, Attorney-General (Lawrence A. Rappoport of counsel), for respondent.

Kane, J. P. Casey, Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., and Mercure, JJ., concur.

Author: Kane

OPINION OF THE COURT

Crane Pond Road is a gravel and dirt roadway located in the Town of Schroon, Essex County, of which the last 2 1/2 miles (hereinafter referred to as the road) lead through State-owned lands to the edge of Crane Pond. That part of the Adirondack Forest Preserve surrounding the road was reclassified “wilderness” in 1979 and, in 1987, the road itself was reclassified wilderness. In December 1989, respondent issued an order, pursuant to Highway Law ? 212, closing the road in accordance with the Adirondack State Land Master Plan. Guidelines within that plan called for the closing of roads which impermissibly allowed for the prohibited use by the public of motorized vehicles and equipment in wilderness areas. Petitioner, the Town Supervisor, subsequently commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge respondent’s authority to close the road pursuant to Highway Law ? 212. Supreme Court found that respondent possessed such authority and dismissed the petition. This appeal followed.

We affirm. Petitioner apparently does not question respondent’s jurisdiction over the lands at issue or the State’s power to close the road, but instead challenges the specific statutory authority pursuant to which respondent ordered said closing. Highway Law Sec 212 was amended in 1988 to read as follows: “If a highway passes over or through lands wholly owned and occupied by the state, the location of such portion of such highway as passes through such lands may be altered and changed, or the same may be abandoned or the use thereof as a highway discontinued with the consent and approval of the state authority having jurisdiction or control over such lands by an order directing such change in location, abandonment or discontinuance. Such order shall contain a description of that portion of the highway the location of which has been changed, abandoned or discontinued, and a description of the new location thereof, if any, and shall be filed in the office of the state authority having control of such lands.” The 1988 amendment eliminated the need for the Commissioner of Transportation to issue the order of closure (see, L 1988, ch 161, ? 2), essentially leaving that decision to the State agency having appropriate jurisdiction (see, mem of State Dept of Transp, 1988 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 1980-1981). Petitioner argues that the express language of the statute does not specifically authorize respondent to issue an order of closure and that no such power may properly be inferred therefrom. We disagree.

The primary consideration of statutory construction is legislative intent (see, Matter of Long v Adirondack Park Agency, 76 N.Y.2d 416, 422; Hudson City Savs. Inst. v Drazen, 153 A.D.2d 91, 93; see also, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes ? 92), and courts are to avoid a literal construction when it leads to either a frustration of the over-all design of the Legislature (see, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes ? 111) or an ineffectually absurd result (see, Matter of Long v Adirondack Park Agency, supra, at 421; see also, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes ?? 144, 145). The legislative intent behind Highway Law ? 212 was to permit the State to close roads on State lands that endangered a State purpose (see, Matter of Altona Citizens Comm. v Hennessy, 77 A.D.2d 956, 957, lv denied 52 N.Y.2d 705). Adopting petitioner’s view, that respondent has the power to consent to and approve the closing of a roadway but does not possess the authority to order its closure, would eviscerate the statute and render it meaningless. In our view, the statute’s expressed intent provides an ample basis and rationale to conclude that “the state authority having jurisdiction or control over [state] lands” (Highway Law ? 212) is empowered to issue orders effectuating that authority. Accordingly, respondent’s order was a valid exercise of the statutory power given to the appropriate State agency pursuant to Highway Law ? 212.

Disposition

Judgment affirmed, without costs.

North Up to Piseco-Powley

In the Matter of the Alleged Violations by JAMES W. McCULLEY, Respondent. (2009)

This is an excerpt of relvant portions of this adminstrative law decision.

2. Department’s Jurisdiction To Regulate Motor Vehicle Traffic Over Old Mountain Road

Department staff contends that the portion of Lot 146 owned by the State is part of the forest preserve. Accordingly, staff asserts jurisdiction to regulate motor vehicle traffic over that portion of Old Mountain Road that crosses State-owned land.

Department staff has established that the State-owned portion of Lot 146 is part of the forest preserve. It is undisputed that the State acquired the northern half and southeastern quarter of Lot 146 in 1875 (see Deed, Department Exh 48, at 556). The forest preserve was subsequently created by chapter 283 of the Laws of 1885, which provided in relevant part:

“All lands now owned or which may hereinafter be acquired by the state of New York within the counties of . . . Essex . . . shall constitute and be known as the forest preserve.”

(L 1885, ch 283, § 7). Chapter 283 is now codified at ECL 9- 0101(6). Thus, the State-owned portion of Lot 146 was and remains part of the forest preserve.

The existence of Old Mountain Road as a public right of way, however, pre-dates the State’s ownership of Lot 146. In the 1810 legislation appropriating money for the repair of Old Mountain Road, the State Legislature declared the road to be a “public highway” (L 1810, ch CLXXVII, § I). Because the Legislature did not provide for acquisition of the fees underlying the public highway, the public acquired merely an easement of passage, the fee title remaining in the landowners (see Bashaw v Clark, 267 AD2d 681, 684-685 [1999]). Thus, when the State acquired its portion of Lot 146 from the prior landowner, it did so subject to a public highway in the nature of an easement (see id.; see also Matter of Moncure v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 218 AD2d 262, 267 [1996] [when the Department acquires forest preserve lands burdened by a leasehold, the Department takes such property subject to that leasehold]).

Department staff asserts that subsequent statutory law vests the Department with jurisdiction over public rights of way crossing forest preserve land. Accordingly, citing the Vehicle and Traffic Law, Department staff asserts that it has the power to “prohibit, restrict or regulate” motor vehicle traffic on any highway under its jurisdiction, including Old Mountain Road (see Vehicle and Traffic Law [“VTL”] § 1630). Pursuant to section 1630, Department staff claims it has the authority to close Old Mountain Road to motor vehicle traffic while allowing pedestrian and other forms of non-motorized traffic (see Adirondack Park State Land Master Plan [updated June 2001], DEC Exh 17, at 66 [indicated that Old Military Road has been closed]).

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that Old Mountain Road was and remains under the jurisdiction of the Towns of North Elba and Keene. 3 Thus, respondent contends that the exception under 6 NYCRR 196.1(b) for roads under the jurisdiction of a town highway department applies in this case (see 6 NYCRR 196.1[b][1]). Respondent contends that the exception for public rights of way over State land also applies (see 6 NYCRR 196.1[b][5]).4

VTL § 1630 does not itself vest in the Department jurisdiction over any particular highway. Whether a State agency has jurisdiction to regulate motor vehicle traffic pursuant to section 1630 depends upon whether that agency is otherwise authorized by law to regulate the use and management of the public highway at issue (see People v Noto, 92 Misc 2d 611, 612- 613 [1977]; see also Highway Law § 3)

On this motion, it cannot be determined, as a matter of law, which entity has jurisdiction to regulate the use and management of Old Mountain Road. When the New York State Legislature declared Old Mountain Road to be a public highway in 1810, it provided that after an initial four-year period of repair and improvement by a commissioner specially appointed for that purpose, the maintenance of the road would be assumed by the several towns through which it passed (see L 1810, ch CLXXVII, § III). Thus, at the time the State acquired Lot 146, subject to the public right of way, that right of way was apparently a town road under the jurisdiction of the Town of Keene and later the Town of North Elba (see Highway Law § 3[5]).5

Nothing in the submissions on this motion allow me to conclude, as a matter of law, that jurisdiction to regulate the use and management of Old Mountain Road has transferred from the Towns of North Elba and Keene to the Department. To the contrary, conflicting statutory provisions and circumstantial evidence require further legal argument and evidentiary proof before such a determination can be made.

For example, in support of Departmental jurisdiction to regulate traffic, Department staff notes that when the powers of the Conservation Department were revised in 1916, the “free use of roads” provision from the 1885 law limiting the forest commission’s power to prescribe rules and regulations for the forest preserve, was eliminated (see L 1916, ch 451). Staff further notes that the current ECL and Executive Law provisions authorizing the Department to make necessary rules and regulations for the protection of the forest preserve generally, and the Adirondack Park specifically, contain no limitation on regulating the free use of roads (see ECL 9-0105[3]; Executive Law § 816). However, although the Department has the power to regulate uses of the forest preserve generally, and the Adirondack Park specifically, it does not necessarily follow that such power includes the authority to regulate public rights of way under the jurisdiction of other State entities or municipalities.

In contrast, legislation adopted subsequent to 1916 suggests that the Department was not vested with the power to regulate use and maintenance of highways in the forest preserve. In 1924, the former State Commission of Highways was granted the power to maintain existing State and county highways in the forest preserve (see L 1924, ch 275). In 1937, town superintendents were expressly granted the right to occupy a right of way over State lands as may be required in the maintenance or reconstruction of town highways that cross those lands, subject to the approval of the Superintendent of Public Works and the Conservation Commissioner (see L 1937, ch 488). The grant of a right of way over State land to maintain and repair town highways strongly implies that towns retained jurisdiction over town highways in the forest preserve, notwithstanding the Department’s grant of authority to regulate the forest preserve generally (see Flacke v Town of Fine, 113 Misc 2d 56 [1982]).

Department staff also points out that Old Mountain Road has not appeared on either the Town of North Elba or the Town of Keene inventory of town highways. The evidence on this is equivocal, however. Old Mountain Road has not appeared on any inventory of State or county highways either (see L 1921, ch 18 [designating system of State and county highways]). On the other hand, Old Mountain Road did appear on a 1935 Highway Survey Commission map, although its status as a State, county or town highway is not indicated (see Department Exhs 51-53).

Respondent provides some circumstantial evidence suggesting that the Towns of North Elba and Keene retain the jurisdiction to regulate traffic on Old Mountain Road. For example, in 1971, the Town of North Elba adopted a resolution, which is still in effect, regulating the use of snowmobiles on Old Mountain Road (see N. Elba Ordinance [2-12-71], Affidavit of Norman Harlow, Highway Superintendent, Town of North Elba, Exh B). Respondent also provides letters dated June 7 and November 13, 1996, respectively, from Mr. Tom Wahl, former Department Regional Forester, expressing the opinion that Old Mountain Road remains a town highway (see Respondent Exhs 16 and 17).

Finally, research reveals some authority suggesting that Old Mountain Road is under the jurisdiction of predecessors to the Department of Transportation (see People v Paul Smith’s Elec. Light and Power and R.R. Co., Sup Ct, Essex County, July 29, 1953, Imrie, J., Decision, at 3-4, 6; 1950 Opn of the Atty Gen 153-154). Whether the portions of Old Mountain Road at issue here are subject to the above authorities, however, is unclear at this time.

In sum, legal and factual issues exist concerning whether the Department has jurisdiction under VTL § 1630 to regulate motor vehicle traffic on Old Mountain Road that require further hearings and legal argument.

3. Request for Relief Pursuant to Highway Law § 212

In its motion for order without hearing, Department staff requests an order of the Commissioner declaring Old Mountain Road between the eastern and western boundaries of the Sentinel Range Wilderness Area closed to all motorized vehicles and motorized equipment. Among the statutory authorities staff relies upon for this request is Highway Law § 212.

Highway Law § 212 provides:

“If a highway passes over or through lands wholly owned and occupied by the state, the location of such portion of such highway as passes through such lands may be altered and changed, or the same may be abandoned or the use thereof as a highway discontinued with the consent and approval of the state authority having jurisdiction or control over such lands by an order directing such change in location, abandonment or discontinuance”

The Department is the State authority with jurisdiction to order abandonment or discontinuance of roads over forest preserve lands in order to protect a relevant State interest (see Matter of Kelly v Jorling, 164 AD2d 181 [1990], lv denied 77 NY2d 807 [1991]; see also Matter of Altona Citizens Comm., Inc. v Hennessy, 77 AD2d 956, lv denied 52 NY2d 705). Such authority includes the power to order the discontinuance or abandonment of town highways (see id.).

Department staff does not address this request for relief in its brief in support of its motion. Nevertheless, to the extent Department staff contends that the Department has already closed Old Mountain Road pursuant to Highway Law § 212, I conclude that triable issues exist before the requested relief may be granted. Staff supplies no evidence that a Departmental order pursuant to Highway Law § 212 has been filed with respect to that portion of Old Mountain Road that is at issue in this case. Accordingly, to the extent Department staff relies upon such a closure order in support of the violation alleged against respondent, staff has not established a prima facie case.

With respect to abandonment, an order of closure is not required to deem a public right of way extinguished by operation of law if the highway has in fact been abandoned by the public for six years or more (see Matter of Wills v Town of Orleans, 236 AD2d 889, 890 [1997]). However, the record reveals triable issues of fact concerning abandonment (see Matter of Smigel v Town of Rensselaerville, 283 AD2d 863, 864 [2001] [a determination of abandonment is a factual determination]).

Pedestrian use and even recreational use may support a finding of non-abandonment, even if a highway has not been subject to motor vehicle traffic, as staff alleges in this case (see Town of Leray v New York Cent. R. Co., 226 NY 109 [1919] [pedestrian use may preserve highway though vehicles are barred]; Matter of Smigel, 283 AD2d at 865 [recreational use may preclude finding of abandonment]). The record contains conflicting evidence concerning the degree to which the public has continued to use the road, thereby necessitating a hearing on abandonment.

With respect to discontinuance, assuming Department staff is seeking a prospective order from the Commissioner, such a prospective order would not support the violation alleged here. Moreover, it is not clear what findings, if any, the Commissioner must make and whether such an order can be issued on the present record. Again, Department staff does not address this item of relief in its brief. Accordingly, the request for a prospective order of closure pursuant to Highway Law § 212 is denied, without prejudice.

 Purple Flowers Along Otter Brook Road

Adirondack Council Press Release (2009).

You can read it here.

ADIRONDACK COUNCIL CALLS ON ENCON COMMISSIONER GRANNIS TO CLOSE FOREST PRESERVE ROADS IN WAKE OF JUDGE’S DECISION

Administrative Judge Declares Former Town Road in State Wilderness Area to be Open for Motorized Use; Grannis Should Re-Close it and Any Others Affected

For more information:
John F. Sheehan
518-432-1770 (ofc)
518-441-1340 (cell)

Released: Thursday, May 21, 2009

LAKE PLACID, N.Y. – The Adirondack Council today called on NYS Department of Environmental Conservation Commissioner Peter Grannis to use his administrative authority to re-close a former road in an Adirondack Wilderness Area that was opened to motorized traffic today by a state administrative law judge.

“It appears from the judge’s decision that the state didn’t properly close this road when it assumed ownership of it and converted it to a hiking, ski and horse trail,” said Adirondack Council Executive Director Brian L. Houseal. “But today’s decision doesn’t have to be the final word on the matter.

“Commissioner Grannis has the authority to use the NYS Vehicle and Traffic Law to prohibit the use of motorized vehicles on this and other roads that are affected by this decision,” Houseal explained. “We urge Commissioner Grannis to begin that process right away. He should have done so today, as this decision was announced, to avoid the chance that someone is already out there riding a jeep or an all-terrain vehicle on this road.

“It is also imperative that the DEC issue its ATV Policy for state lands, which was first announced by Commissioner Erin Crotty during the Pataki Administration,” Houseal said. “DEC cannot allow fragile wildlife habitat and water quality to suffer in New York’s premiere Wilderness Park due to DEC’s inability to complete its work in a timely way.”

Commissioner Grannis can act right now to stop motorized traffic in off-limits locations in the Adirondack Park by exercising NYS Highway Law Section 212, Houseal said,

NYS Highway Law Section 212:

§ 212. Changing location of highways over certain lands owned and occupied by the state. If a highway passes over or through lands wholly owned and occupied by the state, the location of such portion of such highway as passes through such lands may be altered and changed, or the same may be abandoned or the use thereof as a highway discontinued with the consent and approval of the state authority having jurisdiction or control over such lands by an order directing such change in location, abandonment or discontinuance. Such order shall contain a description of that portion of the highway the location of which has been changed, abandoned or discontinued, and a description of the new location thereof, if any, and shall be filed in the office of the state authority having control of such lands.

“If Commissioner Grannis doesn’t make use of Section 212, today’s decision could turn into a disaster for the natural character of the Adirondack Park,” Houseal explained. “There are more than one million acres of protected, roadless Wilderness in the Adirondack Park. It represents nearly 85 percent of all roadless, wilderness forest lands in the eastern United States. Yet, it is only 1/30th of New York State’s total land area – very rare.

“Opening these roads to motorized traffic will harm wildlife, water quality and the peaceful nature of the last big place left in the Northeast where you can escape the noise and pollution of motorized traffic,” he said.

Under the Adirondack Park State Land Master Plan, approved by the Legislature in 1972, all motorized or mechanized travel is banned by state law in Adirondack Wilderness Areas, including mountain bikes.

Another 1.5 million acres of the public Adirondack Forest Preserve is classified as Wild Forest, where motorized traffic is allowed on some designated highways, but not in sensitive areas. Today’s ruling could be interpreted to mean that any road that was never lawfully abandoned to motorized traffic is now open, regardless of its classification as Wilderness or Wild Forest.

The Adirondack Council is a privately funded not-for-profit organization dedicated to ensuring the ecological integrity and wild character of New York’s 9,300-square-mile Adirondack Park. The Council carries out its mission through research, education, advocacy and legal action. The Council has members in all 50 United States and on four continents.

Tiny Roadside Campsite

Resolution from Adirondack Assocation of Towns (2010).

From their 2010 Adirondack Towns Association Resolution Book.

RESOLUTION REQUESTING AMENDMENT OF HIGHWAY LAW SECTION 212 BACKGROUND OF RESOLUTION

The State of New York has closed Town roads in the Adirondacks without the consent and against the wishes of the involved Towns. Highway Law Section 212 which has been interpreted by the courts to authorize the Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Conservation to close roads by Commissioner’s order should be repealed or amended to remove that authority, because it does not provide due process to residents and the involved Towns. The remaining provisions of the Highway Law provide a procedure for towns to close abandoned town roads and to discontinue maintenance on roads which do not provide access to structures by declaring them to be “Qualified Abandoned”.

Whereas, Highway Law Section 212 entitled “Changing location of highways over certain lands owned and occupied by the state” provides as follows:

“If a highway passes over or through lands wholly owned and occupied by the state, the location of such portion of such highway as passes through such lands may be altered and19 changed, or the same may be abandoned or the use thereof as a highway discontinued with the consent and approval of the state authority having jurisdiction or control over such lands by an order directing such change in location, abandonment or discontinuance. Such order shall contain a description of that portion of the highway the location of which has been changed, abandoned or discontinued, and a description of the new location thereof, if any, and shall be filed in the office of the state authority having control of such lands.”

Whereas, the Appellate Division held in Altona Citizens Committee, Incorporated v. Hennessy, 77 AD2d 956 (3rd Dept., 1980) that “Section 212 as originally adopted, related to closing or changing the location of highways passing over lands wholly owned and occupied by the State for farm or prison purposes (L. 1920, ch. 558, s 1). In 1924, the statute was amended to permit the application of the statute to State lands without regard to their use (L. 1924, ch. 141). The removal of the restriction that only prison or farm lands were covered by the statute indicates a legislative intention that closure be permitted whenever a State purpose is endangered by a roadway on State land. To effectuate this intention of the Legislature the occupancy requirement of section 212 of the Highway Law should be given a liberal construction.”

Whereas, the State used Section 212 to close a road in the Town of Altona in the 1970s despite the fact that the State did not occupy the land and despite the fact that the land was occupied by the Ganienkeh group of Indians; and Whereas, the State used Section 212 to close a road in the Town of Wells in the 1970s (see Town of Wells v. New York State Department of Transportation, 90 Misc2d 535 [Sup. Ct. Hamilton County, 1977]); and

Where as, in December 1989 the Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Conservation ordered the closure of a well traveled town road (Crane Pond Road) in the Town of Schroon pursuant to Section 212, without the approval and despite the opposition of the duly elected officials of the Town of Schroon, (see Kelly v. Jorling, 164 AD2d 181 [3rd Dept., 1990]); and

Whereas, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation proposes in the Silver Lake Unit Management Plan recently approved by the Adirondack Park Agency to “work with the Town of Wells”: to close the West River Road in the Town of Wells; and

Whereas, the Town Board of the Town of Wells is adamantly opposed to the closure of West River Road and wishes to continue to maintain it and to keep it open to the traveling public as it has been open for many decades; and

Whereas, Highway Law Section 212 as it currently exists; and as it has been interpreted, is a threat to the authority of the duly elected officials of the Town of Wells and their ability to maintain their transportation system; and20

Whereas, Section 212 also constitutes a threat to every town and village in the Adirondacks which has a town and village road passing through state lands,

NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby RESOLVED that the Adirondack Association of Towns and Villages hereby requests that a bill be introduced in the New York State Legislature to amend Section 212 to make it clear that Section 212 may not be used by the State to close town and village roads in the Adirondacks, except where the lands are occupied and used by the State for prison or farm purposes as Section 212 provided when originally enacted.

CURRENT STATUS: DEC Commissioner Grannis dismissed an enforcement proceeding in Essex County against an individual driving on a road that the DEC had said was Forest Preserve on the ground that it had not been demonstrated that the road was an abandoned road or that the road was not a legal right-ofway for public use. The decision of Commissioner Grannis supports the town’s position that the DEC does not have the authority to close town roads that the town has continually maintained and does not wish to abandon.

Milepost 6 on Plains Road

Assemblywomen Sayward’s Bill Limiting Section 212 to Areas Outside of Adirondack Park (2011).

                STATE OF NEW YORK
        ________________________________________________________________________
 
            S. 343                                                    A. 149
 
                               2011-2012 Regular Sessions
 
                SENATE - ASSEMBLY
 
                                       (Prefiled)
 
                                     January 5, 2011
                                       ___________
 
        IN  SENATE — Introduced by Sen. LITTLE — read twice and ordered print-
          ed, and when printed to be committed to the Committee  on  Transporta-
          tion
 
        IN  ASSEMBLY — Introduced by M. of A. SAYWARD — read once and referred
          to the Committee on Transportation
 
        AN ACT to amend the highway law, in relation to changing the location of
          highways over certain lands owned and occupied by  the  state  in  the
          Adirondack park
 
          The  People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assem-
        bly, do enact as follows:
 
     1    Section 1. Section 212 of the highway law, as amended by  chapter  161
     2  of the laws of 1988, is amended to read as follows:
     3    §  212.  Changing  location  of  highways over certain lands owned and
     4  occupied by the state. 1. If a highway  passes  over  or  through  lands
     5  wholly  owned and occupied by the state, the location of such portion of
     6  such highway as passes through such lands may be altered and changed, or
     7  the same may be abandoned or the use thereof as a  highway  discontinued
     8  with the consent and approval of the state authority having jurisdiction
     9  or  control  over  such  lands  by  an  order  directing  such change in
    10  location, abandonment or discontinuance.  Such  order  shall  contain  a
    11  description  of  that  portion  of the highway the location of which has
    12  been changed, abandoned or discontinued, and a description  of  the  new
    13  location  thereof, if any, and shall be filed in the office of the state
    14  authority having control of such lands.
    15    2. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any highway with-
    16  in the Adirondack park, as defined in subdivision one of section  9-0101
    17  of the environmental conservation law.
    18    § 2. This act shall take effect immediately.
 
         EXPLANATION--Matter in italics (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
                              [ ] is old law to be omitted.
                                                                   LBD01285-01-1